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This thesis examines the relationship between economic integration and 
immigration within the framework of complex interdependency and their impact 
on interstate relations. The hypothesis is that rising racial and ethnic tensions will 
result in a demand for increasingly restrictive immigration policies, which in turn 
can have an adverse effect on the economic integration process. The thesis 
compares two case studies: 1) the United States and Mexico within the context 
of NAFTA, and 2) Venezuela and Colombia within the context of the G-3 accord. 
In both case studies, concern over the economy and ability to absorb immigrant 
groups within the receiving countries (the United States and Venezuela) has created 
a demand for more restrictive immigration policies and tighter enforcement. 
Domestic considerations have traditionally prevailed in the unilateral formulation 
of immigration policy. However, with increased integration, immigration has 
begun to acquire increasing foreign policy implications. The persistence in 
following a unilateral immigration approach inconsistent with the economic 
integration process could strain interstate relations and hinder further integration. 
Although NAFTA and the G-3 accord have been in effect for less than one year, 
current events suggest that the incompatibility in policies, especially in the case of 
the United States and Mexico, has begun to affect bilateral relations. The thesis 
therefore recommends a bilateral approach to immigration policy, which will be 
more conducive to the process of economic integration. Accesion For 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In order to examine the relationship between economic integration and 
immigration, this thesis presents a comparative analysis of the United States and Mexico 
within the context of NAFTA, and Venezuela and Colombia within the context of the G-3 
accord. The thesis analyses the impact of economic integration and immigration on 
interstate relations, with an emphasis on illegal immigration. The analysis is conducted 
within the theoretical framework of complex and asymmetrical interdependency, as 
defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in Power and Interdependence (1977). 
Various studies conducted on the relationship between economic integration and 
immigration have shown that the short-to-medium term impact of economic integration 
on immigration will likely increase migratory pressures. In the long run, however, 
migratory pressures will subside in response to economic development and growth as job 
markets expand and wages increase (Dolores Acevedo and Thomas J. Espenshade, 1992; 
Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L. Martin, 1993; and Joyce C. Vialet, 1993). Although 
economic integration has been portrayed as a solution for illegal immigration by advocates 
of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), it has not been directly addressed within the context 
of the agreements. Instead, immigration policy has continued to develop independently 
of economic integration, as both the United States and Venezuela continue to pursue a 
unilateral approach in relation to Mexico and Colombia, respectively. This approach is 
inconsistent with the foreign policy implications that immigration-related issues have 
acquired as a result of continued economic and social integration, and could potentially 
have a destabilizing effect on interstate relations. The unilateral pursuit of increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies could indirectly undermine or complicate integration 
efforts by exacerbating existing tensions. 
Strong bilateral ties fostered by economic integration and a host of common 
interests suggest that the relationship between the United States and Mexico can best be 
described in terms of an asymmetrical interdependency, with the United States as the 
dominant partner. Although the relationship between Venezuela and Colombia appears 
to be less interdependent and less asymmetrical, several of the same generalizations on 
interdependent processes and characteristics can still be applied. 
ix 
The influx of large numbers of illegal immigrants and its attendant costs have 
contributed to heightening, in both cases, the host country's sensitivity to immigration, 
prompting an increased demand for restrictive policies. In Venezuela, concern over the 
social and economic impact of illegal immigration led to the nullification of Decree 1.911, 
which granted citizenship to children born in that country from illegal immigrants. In the 
United States, this concern has manifested itself in such measures as California's 
Proposition 187, aimed at curtailing illegal immigrant access to public education and 
social services. Although the constitutionality of Proposition 187 is questionable and its 
implementation (if at all) may take years, several states with large illegal immigrant 
populations are currently contemplating similar measures. 
In the United States, the increased politicization of this issue has polarized the 
federal and state governments. Venezuela, in contrast, has been able to pursue a national 
policy without the same degree of internal dissent and lack of consensus which have 
characterized American politics on illegal immigration. Venezuela's capacity to act in a 
more coordinated manner is enhanced by a strong central government as opposed to the 
United States, where state and local governments enjoy a considerable amount of political 
and fiscal autonomy. As a result, in the United States, state policies tend to reflect local 
interest more than national interests, whereas in Venezuela, national interests will usually 
prevail over state and local interests. 
Domestic considerations have traditionally prevailed in the unilateral formulation 
of immigration policy. However, with increased integration, the issue of immigration has 
begun to acquire increasing foreign policy implications. Given this added dimension, the 
question arises whether increasingly restrictive immigration policies are ultimately in the 
national interest. The persistence in following a unilateral immigration approach, 
potentially inconsistent with the process of economic integration, could strain interstate 
relations, adversely affecting the process of integration itself. 
Even though Keohane and Nye suggest that in a complex interdependency the use 
of military force will be rendered increasingly ineffective, the potential for conflict and 
misunderstanding remains high as a function of the rise in complexity and multiplicity of 
channels linking states. The use of military force has never been a serious option for 
Mexico in the latter half of the twentieth century, given the differences in military force 
x 
structures with the United States. However, in the case of Venezuela and Colombia, with 
comparable military establishments and a history of border skirmishes, the implications 
of a growing interdependency can be significant, by discouraging the use of a military 
option in lieu of a diplomatic approach. 
Although NAFTA and the G-3 accord have been in effect for less than one year, 
current events, especially in the United States, suggest that the incompatibility in policy 
formulation is having an impact on bilateral relations. Mexico has already voiced its 
concern, renewing a request for bilateral negotiations on the issue of immigration. In 
Colombia, the reaction has been moderated by overlapping national security concerns with 
Venezuela. However, the nature and severity of the long term impact is difficult to 
predict given the short timespan that both agreements have been in effect and the 
complexity of the evolving relationships. This thesis therefore recommends a bilateral 
approach to immigration in order to facilitate border control efforts and ultimately 
improve interstate relations. 
XI 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed substantial changes in the international system as 
countries seek to redefine existing relationships both politically and economically. 
Although the concept of economic integration is not new, the 1990s have seen a 
resurgence of interest in the formation of economic trading blocs in order to enhance 
trading competitiveness and by definition, improve the economic conditions of the 
member nations by fostering economic growth and development. Integration, however, 
is a multifaceted and complex process involving a variety of issues including border 
control and immigration as well as other interrelated and closely associated problems such 
as drug trafficking and corruption. These are issues of increasing sensitivity, particularly 
when viewed within the context of a growing sense of nativism within individual 
countries, fueled in some instances by the real or perceived threats of shrinking job 
markets, poor economic conditions, political uncertainty and old regional antagonisms, all 
of which can potentially hinder the integration process and adversely affect bilateral 
relations. 
In November 1993 the United States, Mexico, and Canada ratified the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), designed to promote and stimulate economic 
growth by removing existing trade barriers. Similar agreements within the framework of 
free trade agreements or common markets have also been adopted by some Latin 
American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay (Mercosur); and 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico (G-3). Unlike the EC, however, which includes 
provisions for the free movement of labor, the free trade agreements envisioned by the 
United States and other countries in the Western Hemisphere do not address this or other 
immigration-related issues directly. 
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on transnational immigration, particularly 
within the context of economic integration throughout the western hemisphere, as 
exemplified by the emergence of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and their combined 
impact on interstate relations based on a model of complex interdependency.  Two case 
studies were chosen: the United States and Mexico within the context of NAFTA; and 
Venezuela and Colombia within the context of the 1994 G-3 accord. Both were selected 
based on the following criteria: (1) they represent examples of cross border migration 
based on a history of labor exchange, with migratory patterns governed by similar socio- 
economic factors; (2) they share many of the same immigration-related problems; and (3) 
their bilateral relations approximate some degree of interdependence.1 
The concept of interdependency provides the theoretical framework within which 
interstate relations are analyzed throughout this study. Interdependent relationships are 
defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye as involving cost-benefit transactions 
which are not necessarily mutually beneficial but rather, are characterized by reciprocal 
effects. Bargaining power or influence over outcomes, through the use of linkage politics, 
can be derived from asymmetries in an interdependent relationship. This is in sharp 
contrast to a full dependency that precludes any autonomy or control over outcomes.2 
In order to understand the power relationship between two actors in an 
interdependent relationship, Keohane and Nye introduce the concepts of vulnerability and 
sensitivity. The impact of any given issue on interstate relations is a function of its 
vulnerabilities and sensitivities. Vulnerability is defined by the authors as "an actor's 
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered 
and is measured by the costs of making effective adjustments to a changed environment 
over a period of time." In contrast, sensitivity is defined as "liability to costs imposed 
from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation." Vulnerabilities 
and sensitivities can be social, political, or economic. Of the two, vulnerability is deemed 
'Robert L. Bach, "Hemispheric Migration," in The United States and Latin 
America in the 1990s:  Bevond the Cold War, ed. by Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, 
& Augusto Varas (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 
264. 
2Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence:  World 
Politics in Transition. (Boston:  Little, Brown & Co., 1977), pp. 3-37. 
more important because it includes a strategic dimension.3 
The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter II describes the methodology 
used. Individual case studies are examined in Chapters III and IV. Each case study is 
analyzed in terms of economic integration; immigration dynamics; immigration-related 
problems such as drug trafficking, crime and corruption; and how these problems are 
perceived by the respective governments and general public. The impact of immigration 
and economic integration on policymaking and interstate relations is discussed in Chapter 
V within the framework of a comparative analysis. Final comments and conclusions are 
provided in Chapter VI. 
3Ibid, p. 16. 

II.  METHODOLOGY 
As an underlying hypothesis, it is proposed that increased racial and ethnic 
tensions will eventually result in a demand for increasingly restrictive immigration 
policies, which in turn could have an adverse and destabilizing effect on the economic 
integration process. In order to evaluate the relationship between economic integration 
and transnational immigration a comparative case study method was chosen as the most 
appropriate type of analysis with integration designated as the independent variable and 
immigration as the dependent variable. Two case studies were selected on the basis of 
shared characteristics: (1) the United States and Mexico, and (2) Venezuela and 
Colombia. Both sets of countries are in the process of implementing free trade 
agreements conducive to greater economic integration while at the same time confronting 
a multitude of challenges and problems associated with large scale transnational migration 
across relatively porous borders.4 
4Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy,  How to Compare Nations:   Strategies in 
Comparative Politics.  (New Jersey:  Chatham House Publishers, Inc, 1984),  pp. 107- 
127. 

III.  UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 
A.    IMMIGRATION 
1.  History and Dynamics 
Geographically, the border between the United States and Mexico extends 1,952 
miles, most of it, approximately 1,200 miles, defined by the Rio Grande (Figure 1). 
Although border related issues have increasingly become a source of tension between both 
countries, the border itself was firmly demarcated by 1854 following the Gadsden 
Purchase (1853) which placed a final strip of land along the bottom of what is now 
Arizona and New Mexico in U.S. hands in exchange for 10 million dollars. The purchase 
was promoted by railroad interests and provided the United States clear title to land in the 
Mesilla Valley south of the Gila River, an area perceived at the time as a potentially good 
southern railroad route to California.5 Prior to that, U.S. expansion beginning with the 
secession from Mexico of Texas in 1836 and culminating with the Mexican American 
War (1846-1848) had already significantly reduced Mexican territory, approximately 50 
percent, in what is currently the southwestern portion of the United States: California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming.6 Under the 
Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty (1848), which formally established the Rio Grande as the 
international boundary between both countries, Mexico was awarded 15 million dollars 
in compensation from the United States for its territorial loss.7 
Politically, socially, and economically, the border represents the dividing line 
between an industrial power and a developing country. It is along the border that the 
disparities between the United States and Mexico are accentuated the most; it is where 
5Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Piano, Latin America:   A Political Dictionary, (Santa 
Barbara:  ABC-CLIO, 1992), p. 202. 
6Tom Barry, Harry Browne, and Beth Sims, The Great Divide, (New York: 
Grove Press, 1994), p. 8. 
7Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Piano, Latin America:   A Political Dictionary, p. 207. 
„    ,.  „        ^X^1-05 Angeles      ?Q Pacific Ocean       \ \ I $ 
X: 
POPULATION 
• Over 1,000,000 
• 250,000-1,000.000 
• 100.000-250,000 
.    Under 100.000 
International Boundary Area Tampico 
Source:  Tom Barry, Harry Browne and Beth Sims, The Great Divide (New York:  Grove Press, 1994) 
Figure 1.  U.S. - Mexican Border. 
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two cultures and societies come together sometimes mixing peacefully and other times 
clashing violently. 
The border between the United States and Mexico is permeable. The region, 
sparsely populated, is dominated by a series of urban centers or twin cities straddling the 
length of the border. Geography, limited resources and manpower have constrained the 
ability of the United States border patrol to control the northbound flow of illegal 
immigrants and narcotics. Despite recent escalating efforts to control the border, results 
have been mixed at best while simultaneously increasing tensions and possibly 
undermining relations along the border. 
The movement or migration of humans across the border is deeply rooted within 
the historical context of the region and has contributed to a gradual merging of cultures 
and economies. The economic interdependency and consequent border economy which 
has developed as an outgrowth, provides the economic basis for the region, dominated 
south of the border by the maquiladoras or export-oriented factories. Despite this 
economic interdependency, an economic imbalance characterized by markedly lower 
standards of living to the south and a poorly developed infrastructure, persists. 
Demographically, the region has been characterized by explosive population 
growth. Juarez and Tijuana are among the largest cities in Mexico's border region with 
more than 1.2 million people each.8 Growth on the Mexican side of the border has been 
spurred by increased economic activity promoted initially by the Border Industrialization 
Program (1965) which opened the northern border states of Mexico to U.S. export- 
oriented investment by eliminating or reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. As a 
result, although Mexican border states have come to enjoy a higher standard of living in 
comparison to the rest of Mexico, it is still significantly lower than that of the United 
States. In comparison, even though the regions adjacent to the border are considered one 
8Barry, Brown, and Sims, The Great Divide,  p. 13. 
of the poorest areas in the United States, per capita income is still three to seven times 
higher than on the Mexican side.9 
Initially settled by the Spanish and controlled by Mexico until 1848, the 
southwestern region of the United States has witnessed a continued rise in the Hispanic 
population attributed largely to immigration. In 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated 
that more than 40 percent of Hispanics were born outside the United States, with the 
majority originating from Mexico. 10 The same census figures showed that 80 percent of 
Hispanic-origin Californians and 91 percent of Hispanic-origin Texans were of Mexican 
descent. Two border states, California and Texas, account for 54 percent of Hispanics. 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans are the largest population group in all border towns 
except San Diego.11 
Additionally, Mexico also continues to serve as a conduit for immigrants from 
other Latin American countries fleeing political and economic instability. Border patrol 
arrests of Central American immigrants (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) peaked in 1989 with 43,000 but has since dropped.12 The decline has been 
ascribed to a variety of reasons including increased enforcement activity by the Mexican 
government along its southern border with Guatemala. Increased regional stability marked 
by the end of civil war in El Salvador and Nicaragua, has also contributed in recent years 
to the observed reduction in the flow of northward bound immigrants from Central 
America. 
In the United States, uncertain economic conditions have prompted national 
concern over the increasing influx of immigrants, particularly illegal immigrants, crossing 
9
 Ibid., p. 16. 
10Maria Jimenez, "War in the Borderlands," Report on the Americas. Vol XXVI, 
Number 1 (July 1992), p. 29. 
"Ibid., p. 21. 
12A1 Kamen, "Fewer Central Americans Captured Entering U.S.," The Washington 
Post. July 28, 1992. 
10 
the border and their effect on the job market. In addition to the economic impact 
immigrants, legal and illegal, may have on the job market, there has also been increasing 
concern on the social and welfare costs of illegal immigration on what is perceived by 
many as an overburdened system subsidized largely at the expense of taxpayers. 
The assessment of the overall impact of immigration, especially illegal 
immigration, on American society has been clouded by the perceived threat that it is 
thought to pose, by some sectors, against the national sovereignty and integrity of the 
United States. Although immigration and immigrant labor have been widely recognized 
as instrumental to the growth of the United States and have come to form part of the 
mythos which defines the national character, there is increasing concern over the country's 
ability and willingness to absorb new immigrants into the social fabric. Currently, 1 of 
12 U.S. residents in the United States is foreign-born compared to 1 in 20 during the 
1970s, yet these figures are still significantly lower than the levels that prevailed from 
1860-1920, when roughly 1 of every 7 Americans was an immigrant. Seventy five 
percent of immigrants, mostly Latins and Asians, have settled in just seven states with 
more than a third of the foreign-born population residing in the state of California.13 The 
feeling by some, is one of a society increasingly under siege with the influx of immigrants 
perceived as destabilizing and contributing to social fractionalization and disharmony. 
2.  Legislation 
An historical overview of immigration policy shows that the first efforts to 
centralize control over immigration began in 1864 with the appointment of a 
Commissioner of Immigration. Initially, states were responsible for the local 
administration of immigration policy, with some federal oversight. By 1891, however, 
Congress created the Bureau of Immigration within the Department of the Treasury, with 
24 inspection stations at various ports and along the Canadian and Mexican borders. In 
1903, the Bureau was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor.   Shortly 
13Dick Kirschten, "Catch-Up Ball," National Journal, August 7, 1993, p. 1978. 
11 
thereafter, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization was formed in 1906 and 
subsequently split into two separate bureaus in 1913.14 
Legislation restricting immigration and setting numerical limits was instituted in 
response to the influx of immigrants immediately following WWI. Border patrol 
activities, as part of the Bureau of Immigration services, were authorized by Congress in 
1924. In 1929, illegal entry became a misdemeanor violation of federal immigration 
laws.15 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was formally created in 1933 
with the consolidation of the Bureaus of Immigration and Naturalization and was 
subsequently moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in 1940.16 
The current basis for INS policies and procedures was established in 1952 by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. This legislation maintained the national origins quota 
system while also creating admission preference categories for skilled aliens and relatives. 
Under this system, the number of admissions according to nationality was set. The 1965 
amendments to the 1952 Act repealed the national origins quota system, substituting 
instead a system based on family reunification and needed skills rather than nationality 
and ethnic considerations. 
In response to the growing number of illegal aliens and deportations, Congress 
passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. The new law provided 
two amnesty programs aimed at legalizing illegal aliens. The first, applied to aliens 
residing in the United States prior to January 1, 1982, the second to aliens who had 
worked in agriculture for at least 90 days during the year ending May 1, 1986. Over 1 
million Mexicans submitted applications under the first category, most of which were 
accepted.  In addition, as a further deterrent, the act established sanctions that could be 
'"Immigration Management:   Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed 
to Address Serious Problems. (GAO/GGD-91-28, January 1991), p. 16 
15Maria Jimenez, "War in the Borderlands," p. 31. 
16Ibid. 
12 
imposed on employers who "knowingly" hired unauthorized or illegal aliens.17 "IRCA 
also sought to respond to the apparent heavy dependence of seasonal agricultural workers 
on illegal workers by creating a seven year special agricultural worker program, and by 
streamlining the previously existing H-2 temporary worker program to expedite 
availability of alien workers and to provide statutory protection for U.S. and alien 
workers."18 
Mexican migrant labor can be traced to the late nineteenth century. Labor demand 
in the United States created by an expanding agricultural sector and railroad industry 
induced Mexican workers to migrate northward in search of employment, thus providing 
a source of cheap and abundant labor. Demand for migrant labor fluctuated in response 
to economic conditions in the United States. Two minor mass migrations occurred during 
the early part of the twentieth century. One was prompted by the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1918) and the second by the outbreak of World War I. Between 1910 and 1930, 
it is estimated that approximately 1.5 million Mexicans or ten percent of the population 
emigrated to the United States.19 A return migration of Mexicans to their own country 
occurred during the Great Depression. With the onset of World War II and resultant labor 
shortage, the United States and Mexico negotiated an executive agreement which 
subsequently became known as the bracero program. Under this program, the U.S. 
government hired Mexicans chosen by the Mexican government and then subcontracted 
the workers out to growers. The program continued until 1964 when it was abandoned 
by the United States in response to growing pressure from civil rights groups and 
'immigration Management:   Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed 
to Address Serious Problems, p. 18. 
1
 "Immigration: What Changes Should Be Made in United States Immigration 
Policy?, 103d Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document 103-19 (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 22. 
19Daniel James, Illegal Immigration - An Unfolding Crisis (Maryland:  University 
Press of America, Inc., 1991), p. 20. 
13 
organized labor.20 
Efforts to curb illegal immigration have largely failed over the years. In fact, 
illegal immigration from Mexico surged after Congress terminated the bracero program. 
Recent estimates of illegal crossings are based on the number of apprehensions by the 
Border Patrol of undocumented aliens. According to the INS, for every individual 
apprehended, 2 to 3 enter the country undetected.21 Based on this, current estimates on 
the number of illegal aliens range anywhere from 2 million to 4 million. In 1992, 94 
percent of Border Patrol apprehensions took place in communities along the border 
between the United States and Mexico. Ninety percent or more of those apprehended 
were Mexican nationals. In 1980, the INS reported 910,361 apprehensions; in 1986, the 
figure peaked at 1,767,400.22 Although the number of apprehensions decreased 
immediately following IRCA in 1988 to 940,641, they have since continued to rise with 
1.2 million apprehensions in 1991.23 24 (Table 1). 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) had two unanticipated 
effects. As mentioned previously, the new law imposed sanctions on employers who 
knowingly hired illegal aliens but did not require that the employer verify the authenticity 
of the documents presented to them by job applicants. This in turn created a demand for 
a market in counterfeit or forged paperwork necessary to prove legal residence and obtain 
employment.   The second effect was to lengthen the stay of undocumented workers due 
20Barry, Browne and Sims, The Great Divide, p. 30. 
21Lizette Alvarez and Lisa Getter, "2 of 3 Immigrants Slip Past Patrol Along the 
Border," Miami Herald, December 14, 1993, p. 11 A. 
22Barry, Browne and Sims, The Great Divide, p. 45. 
23R.A. Zaldivar, "Group Recommends Building Fences, Walls Along Mexican 
Border," Miami Herald. January 26, 1989, p. 19A. 
24Al Kamen,"Fewer Central Americans Captured Entering U.S.," The Washington 
Post. July 28, 1992. 
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Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens 1965-1993 
1965 110,371 1977 1,033,427 1988 954,243 
1966 138,520 1978 1,047,687 1989 1,008,148 
1967 161,608 1979 1,069,400 1990 1,169,939 
1968 212,057 1980 910,361 1991 1,152,667 
1969 283,557 1981 975,780 1992 1,199,560 
1970 345,353 1982 970,246 1993 1,275,00 
1972 505,949 1983 1,251,351 
1973 655,968 1984 1,246,981 
1974 788,145 1985 1,343,749 
1975 756,819 1986 1,767,400 
1976 866,433 1987 1,190,488 
Sources: 
(1) Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
m Daniel James. Immigration an Unfolding Crisis, (Lanham:  University Press of America, 1991), p. 24, 
(1965-1990). 
(3)  Immigration:   What Changes Should be made in United States Immigration Policy?  103d Congress, 2d 
Session/Senate Document 103-19, p. 206 (1991-1993) 
Table 1.  Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens 1965-1993. 
to rising costs and risks involved in crossing the border. As a result, a stronger incentive 
was created for families to migrate together, capitalizing on the extensive network of 
immigrants already in place. In 1991, the number of women crossing the border was 
estimated to have nearly doubled since 1987 and the number of children crossing had also 
increased substantially.25 
The rapid expansion of illegal immigration into the United States can be attributed 
to a number of factors: economic, social and political. Following the Mexican 
revolution, mortality rates in Mexico began to decrease. However, fertility rates remained 
25Scott Armstrong and John Dillin, "Illegal Border Traffic Rising Again," Christian 
Science Monitor. October 16, 1991, p. 7. 
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consistently high. As a result, Mexico's population tripled between 1930 and 1970, 
growing younger in the process. The accelerated growth of the labor force soon 
outstripped the economy's capacity to provide new jobs. Job creation was further stifled 
by economic policies that relied until recently on capital-intensive processes based on a 
system of import substitution, which was sustained by protectionist policies. Currently 
for every 100,000 to 200,000 jobs created in Mexico, there are well over 1 million more 
job seekers every year.26 Demographic shifts within the country in response to large-scale 
urban migration precipitated by a decline in the agricultural sector also added pressure 
to Mexico's labor market. Mexico's economic crisis became acute during the 1980s, 
further exacerbating the increasing trend of illegal immigration as more and more workers 
sought   higher   wages   and   increased   job   opportunities   north   of   the   border. 
3.  Drug Trafficking 
During the last several years, the incidence of violence and illegal activities along 
the border appears to have increased, complicating further the U.S. Border Patrol's ability 
to effectively monitor the border. In 1986, the Border Patrol made 1,300 seizures of 
drugs, with a street value of $186 million; by 1987 seizures had increased to 2,751, with 
a value of $582 million. Most of the seizures during this time consisted of cocaine: 
12,813 pounds worth $399 million in 1987, up from 2,496 pounds worth $99 million in 
1986.27 
Until 1927, the export of marijuana and heroin into the United States from Mexico 
was legal. Demand for drugs in the United States remained low until the 1960s. By 
1975, Mexico had become a major supplier of marijuana (90 percent) and heroin (87 
percent) to the United States. However, in response to an aggressive eradication program 
and increased competition from Colombia and Jamaica, the amount of drugs crossing the 
border experienced a sharp reduction during the early 1980s. This trend was reversed as 
26 Ibid. 
"William Branigin, "New Law Fails to Stem Flow of Mexicans into California," 
The Washington Post. June 23, 1988, p. A30. 
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consumer demand for drugs in the United States continued to expand and economic 
conditions in Mexico worsened in response to an economic crisis, creating a greater 
financial incentive to farm illicit crops. By 1991, Mexico had become a major supplier 
of drugs as well as a major transhipment country for cocaine, supplying 70 percent of the 
marijuana consumed in the United States and 50 percent of the cocaine.28 The amounts 
of money involved are staggering, estimates for Mexico in 1991 placed the value of the 
drug trade equal to that country's total export earnings.29 In fact, narcotics-related assets 
seized under Salinas's presidency through 1991 were in excess of $1 billion.30 
Even though the number of illegal immigrants involved in drug trafficking 
constitute a small minority, it still represents a significant problem with widespread 
ramifications. Illegal aliens sometimes serve as "mules" carrying drugs into the United 
States as payment for being smuggled across the border. Some do so in order to earn 
money, receiving up to $200 per trip.31 Drug smuggling across the border by illegal 
aliens also impinges upon a wide range of illicit activities which in turn contribute to the 
nationwide rise in drug-related violence and crime observed in both countries. 
Although the Mexican government has cracked down on drug trafficking, 
corruption remains a serious problem. Daniel James in his book Illegal Immigration - An 
Unfolding Crisis cites several cases linking Mexican authorities with drug trafficking, 
most notably the 1990 arrest of Jose Antonio Zorrilla, former chief of the Federal Security 
Directorate, for protection of drug traffickers; the 1991 prison takeover by a convicted 
druglord, Oliverio Chavez Araujo in which Mexican Federal Judicial Police agents were 
implicated; and the Enrique Camarena case in which an undercover DEA agent was 
28Barry, Browne and Sims, The Great Divide, p. 52; and Daniel James, Illegal 
Immigration - An Unfolding Crisis, p. 68. 
29Barry, Browne and Sims, The Great Divide, p. 53. 
30Daniel James, Illegal Immigration - An Unfolding Crisis, p. 71. 
3IIbid., p. 69. 
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assassinated by Mexican criminal elements. 
4.  Crime 
In addition to drug trafficking, border crime has grown to include auto thefts; "rob- 
and-return" Tijuana based gangs operating in southern California; and border bandits who 
prey on illegal aliens and migrant workers, often the victims of assaults, robberies and 
rapes. It is estimated that 90 percent of crimes against undocumented workers go 
unreported for fear of deportation.33 Many immigrants are also subject to extortion by 
corrupt government officials. In response, the Mexican government instituted in 1991 a 
program designed to curb corruption. Entry rules and import regulations were simplified 
and a concerted effort was also made to increase public awareness by ensuring the 
necessary information was readily available. As a result, complaints against government 
officials decreased by 78 percent.34 
Criminal activities involving immigrant aliens in general have escalated across the 
country. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons reports that more than 20 percent of federal inmates 
are non-U.S. citizens, from over 120 countries with an incarceration rate three times the 
national average. The majority have been arrested for drug-related offenses. The cost 
involved is processing and imprisoning illegal aliens who commit serious crimes is 
extremely high. In California alone, these costs amount to more than $500 million a year. 
According to the state attorney general, approximately 16,000 illegal aliens are 
incarcerated in state prisons at a yearly cost to taxpayers of $350 million. In Texas, 
another border state, 4.3 percent of the inmates in the state prison system are foreign born 
with a larger proportion, 36 percent, in the Texas federal system. In El Paso, the second 
32Ibid., p. 75. 
"William Branigin, "New Law Fails to Stem Flow of Mexicans into California," 
The Washington Post, June 23, 1988, p. A30. 
34David Clark Scott, "Anti-Corruption Plan Gains Ground in Mexico," Christian 
Science Monitor, December 18, 1990, p. 16. 
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largest border crossing, percentages ranges from 10 to 15 percent.35 
Despite rising crime along the border, crime fighting units from both countries 
were disbanded in 1989 following complaints of corruption and a series of controversial 
actions which had resulted in the suspicious death of at least two Mexican immigrants. 
However, continued violence prompted the recreation of a new crime fighting unit, Beta 
Team, by Mexican authorities in 1992. The team comprised of approximately 40 officers 
from the federal immigration police, the Baja California state judicial police and the 
Tijuana Municipal Police is trained and funded in part by the San Diego police 
department. Statistics showed that crime was reduced by 80 to 85 percent immediately 
following their initial mobilization.36 
5.  Government Corruption 
The rise in illegal immigration has in turn created a lucrative industry based on 
the smuggling of immigrants across the border by independent operatives or coyotes and 
more recently by large mafia-like organizations known as apalabrados. Bribery of 
government officials is common. Payoffs to local police by some of the larger rings can 
range anywhere from $9,000 to $80,000 a month. However, most organizations can earn 
that much in one night by smuggling not only Mexicans but also foreigners from Asia and 
other parts of Latin America. Profits generated range anywhere from $100 million to 
$300 million a year in fees alone, making immigration the fourth largest industry trailing 
tourism, commerce, and the maquiladora industry. Standard rates in 1989 were $100 to 
$150 for a crossing; $300 to $400 to Los Angeles; and up to $1,000 or more for Central 
Americans and other foreigners.37 
35John Tanton and Wayne Lutton, "Immigration and Criminality in the U.S.A.," 
Journal of Social. Political and Economic Studies. Vol 18, No 2, Summer 1993, pp. 
217-231. 
36Tim Golden, "Mexico is Now Acting to Protect Border Migrants from Robbery 
and Abuse," The New York Times. June 28, 1992, p. L3. 
37Brook Larmer, "Business is Booming on the Border,"  Christian Science Monitor, 
July 27, 1989, p. 1. 
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Corruption is not limited to south of the border. As mentioned previously, one 
of the unintended effects of IRCA was to create a booming business based on the sale of 
forged documents necessary to validate an individual's resident status. These documents 
include but are not limited to social security cards, green cards, driver's licenses, and 
state IDs. Of these, the green card (1-551, United States Alien Registration Card) is 
probably the most sought after. The street value of any given document varies according 
to the quality of the reproduction. Forged documents can be easily purchased from street 
vendors in Los Angeles. A packet containing two cards, a social security and a green 
card, ranges in price from $40 to $55 dollars.38 However, prices can range as high as 
$325 for a border crossing card; $2,300 for a temporary U.S. residency permit; and 
$5,600 for a green card, depending on its quality and intended use.39 Most troubling to 
authorities has been the sale of forged birth certificates. Generally more expensive than 
green cards, birth certificates are often used by individuals to obtain U.S. passports which 
can then be used to obtain valid social security cards, thus enabling them to apply for 
welfare benefits. 
In 1992 investigators uncovered a computer fraud scheme involving 1,700 illegal 
alien files. Codenamed Operation Byte, the investigation revealed that an INS employee 
was charging as much as $40,000 to get into the INS computer in order to grant 
permanent residency status to ineligible foreigners. Computer fraud has led INS in 
conjunction with the Office of the Inspector General to establish computer audit trails in 
order to prevent fraudulent data manipulation. However, a recent New York Times 
article indicates that although the system has been implemented, it is not being used due 
to lack of manpower within the agency. In addition to computerized fraud, an estimated 
$1 million in bribes were offered to INS employees during 1992.   Bribes for allowing 
38
"I-551," 60 Minutes, CBS News, July 31, 1994, Transcript, Volume XXVI, No 
46,  p. 14. 
39Lisa Getter and Lizette Alvarez, "Some INS Employees Cross Over the Line," 
Miami Herald, December 13, 1993, p. 13A. 
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illegal aliens to cross the border ranged from $25,000 for a car; $30,000 for a van; and 
$100,000 for a tractor-trailer. As a further example of corruption, several employees of 
a local Washington D.C. District Office involved in a bribery scheme were arrested along 
with more than half dozen immigration brokers, between July 1992 and December of 
1993, following an undercover operation. Office employees were typically being paid 
$100 per work card, while the middlemen or brokers were charging immigrants $500 to 
$700. 40 
6.  Immigrant Abuse 
Additional criticism has recently been directed against the Border Patrol for 
excessive use of violence against illegal immigrants. Two reports published by Americas 
Watch, Brutality Unchecked (1992) and Frontier Injustice (1993), have been extremely 
critical of the agency's overall performance. According to Americas Watch, beatings and 
other forms of mistreatment and abuse are still common during the arrest and detention 
of undocumented immigrants, U.S. citizens and legal residents. Abuses range from 
verbal insults, mistreatment, beatings, unjustified shootings to, sexual assaults.41 
Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs records 117 cases of human rights abuses by U.S. 
officials against migrants from 1988 to 1990, including 14 deaths. Data independently 
collected by the U.S.-Mexico Border Program of the American Friends, a Quaker human 
rights group, shows that since 1980, Border Patrol agents have shot dozens of people, 
killing 11 and permanently disabling 10.42 Additional data from the Immigration Law 
Enforcement Project of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) collected over 
40Ibid.; and Stephen Engelberg, "In Immigration Labyrinth, Corruption Comes 
Easily," The New York Times. September 12, 1994, p. Al, A10. 
"""Frontier Justice:  Abuses Along the U.S. Border with Mexico Amid Climate of 
Impunity," Americas Watch, May 13, 1993, Vol V, No. 4, p. 2.  This report is a 
follow up to "Brutality Unchecked:  Human Rights Abuses Along the U.S. Border 
with Mexico," published by Americas Watch. May 1992. 
42David Clark Scott, "Mexico and Rights Groups Decry Violence by US Border 
Patrol," Christian Science Monitor. June 2, 1992, p. 5. 
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a five year period, reveals that the most common abuses reported (28 percent) were verbal 
or psychological. These involved cases in which immigration authorities used racial or 
ethnic insults, rude or abusive language, and threats or coercion.43 In response, between 
1982 and 1990 Mexico filed at least 24 diplomatic notes of protest with the U.S. State 
Department on behalf of Mexicans who were killed or seriously injured by these agents.44 
The Border Patrol does not deny that abuses occur, however it does contend that 
the problem is not as severe as it appears. The agency claims that it receives on average 
of one complaint for every 17,000 arrests. Given that the INS makes approximately 
1,200 arrests a day, this translates into approximately 26 complaints per year. Data from 
immigrant right groups suggests somewhat higher numbers of complaints, possibly closer 
to 142 per year.45 The differences may be ascribed to a variety of reasons including fear 
and ignorance by immigrants, which often leads to underreporting of abuse. Violence 
along the border is not always directed at immigrants. In 1990 there were 217 reports of 
assaults against border agents and in 1991, 132 reports.46 
7.   Social Costs 
One of the most persistent complaints directed at immigrant groups, particularly 
illegal immigrants, is the added social burden that they represent to American society. 
Often they are perceived as living off welfare at the expense of American taxpayers. A 
1993 Gallup poll conducted on the issue of immigration reveals interesting trends in 
public opinion concerning different immigrant groups. Specifically on the issue of Latin 
American immigrants and welfare, 60 percent of those polled felt that Latin American 
immigrants were apt to end up on welfare and 62 percent felt they were apt to increase 
43Maria Jimenez, "War in the Borderlands," p. 32. 
'""Brutality Unchecked:  Human Rights Abuses Along the U.S. Border with 
Mexico," Americas Watch Report, May 1992, p. 6. 
45Ibid., p. 27. 
46David Clark Scott, "Mexico and Rights Groups Decry Violence by U.S. Border 
Patrol,"  p. 5. 
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crime. On the question of whether the number of immigrants now entering the United 
States is too high, over 60 percent of those polled felt that too many immigrants were 
being allowed in not only from Latin America but also from Asian and Arab countries. 
In contrast, 52 percent felt that European immigration was about right.47 The survey 
revealed growing concern over the impact of immigration, with public opinion appearing 
to generally favor more restrictive policies. In another recent survey, 7 in 10 people said 
they favored paying for welfare reform by denying assistance to legal immigrants for at 
least five years.48 
An October 1994 U.S. News and World Report article on immigration and welfare 
indicates that only 2 percent of Mexican immigrants within the United States were apt to 
end up on welfare (Table 2). According to current legislation, most legal immigrants are 
barred from welfare programs for three years. Illegal immigrants are barred by law from 
receiving Aid to Families for Dependent Children (AFDC); Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Food Stamps; Medicaid except for 
emergency conditions; legal services; assistance under the Job Training Partnership Act; 
unemployment compensation; and postsecondary student financial aid. There are, 
however, other social service programs for which illegal immigrants may be eligible, since 
they do not require provisions regarding alien status49 (Table 3). In 1993 immigrants 
accounted for 9 percent of the U.S. population but constituted only 5 percent of all 
families receiving federal welfare checks or food stamps. Two exceptions to this are 
political refugees and the elderly.   In California alone, 55 percent of elderly Chinese 
471993 Gallup Poll, Survey #GO 422002, Interviewing Date:  7/9-11/93, pp. 250- 
254. 
48Drian Friedman and Penny Loeb, "The myth of the parasites." U.S. News and 
World Report, October 3, 1994, p. 38. 
49Joyce C. Vialet and Larry M. Eig, "Alien Eligibility for Federal Assistance," 
CRS Report for Congress. 94-73 EPW, February 2, 1994, p. CRS-3. 
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Recent immigrants and welfare 
Members of some immigrant groups are 
much more likely than others to end up on 
welfare, and elderly newcomers are most 
likely of all to get benefits. 
Share of immigrants receiving welfare. 
Dlace of birth 
Cambodia 28% 
Laos 27% 
Soviet Union (former) 20% 
Vietnam 16% 
Dominican Republic 9% 
China 6% 
Phillipines 4% 
South Korea 4% 
Mexico 2% 
Note: Figures are for immigrant groups with 
largest numbers on welfare, are from 1990 and 
refer only to immigrants and refugees arriving 
since 1980-Basic date: U.S. News computer 
analysis of Census Bureau data. 
Table 2.  Recent Immigrants and Welfare. 
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Table 3.   Summary of Alien Eligibility for Selected Programs. 
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immigrants are on welfare.50 "Although illegal aliens are barred from most welfare 
programs, a recent INS study found that 83 percent of them held fraudulent Social 
Security cards."51 
The financial burden is not evenly distributed. California and Florida, two states 
with some of the largest immigrant populations, recently sued the federal government for 
reimbursement of costs incurred from illegal immigration. In August 1993, California 
Governor Pete Wilson sued for $2.3 billion and urged the federal government to deny 
citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants. Currently under U.S. law, 
school age children must be educated whether illegal or not. According to a San Diego 
State University study, the cost to California of taking children of undocumented aliens 
into the school system is estimated at approximately  $60 million per year.52 
Public health problems have also worsened in several large border cities. For 
example, the incidence of tuberculosis has increased. In El Paso, Texas, 60 percent of 
those with tuberculosis are foreign born.53 In Miami, Florida, Jackson Memorial Hospital 
treats on average of more than 20 illegal aliens a day or 8,000 cases a year.54 More than 
half are maternity cases, because parents know that children born in the United States are 
considered U.S. citizens and thus entitled to a wide range of benefits. The added services 
translate into increased costs. Between 1983 and 1989, unreimbursed health care to illegal 
aliens cost Los Angeles County    $778.8 million.    In addition, California Medicaid 
50Ibid. 
5
'Steven V. Roberts, Paul Glastris, Jim Impoco, and Katia Hetter, "Shutting the 
Golden Door," U.S. News & World Report. October 3, 1994, p. 36. 
52Bill Lenderking, "The U.S.-Mexican Border and NAFTA:  Problem or 
Paradigm?," North-South Focus, University of Miami, Vol II, No. 3, November 3, 
1993, p. 2. 
53Ibid. 
54Steven V. Roberts, Paul Glastris, Jim Impoco, and Katia Hetter, "Shutting the 
Golden Door," p. 38. 
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administrators are faced with the problem of Medicaid fraud by illegal aliens who cross 
the border to receive subsidized medical assistance using false documents. In 1989, 
Medicaid coverage to illegal aliens cost California $300 million.55 Total cost to California 
for services provided to illegal immigrants has been estimated at approximately $3 billion 
a year.56 
According to the Urban Institute, a Washington think tank, states spend twice as 
much on foreign born residents as the immigrants pay in taxes. A 1985 study of Mexican 
aliens in Southern California found that immigrant households received $2,200 more in 
state and local services, including education, than they paid in taxes. It should be noted, 
however, that most illegal aliens are concentrated in low-paying non-permanent jobs, at 
or below minimum wage, hence tax liability is comparatively low. 
Assessing the costs of illegal immigration is difficult due to the limited availability 
of cost data from the federal and state agencies responsible for administering public 
programs. In addition, illegal immigrants are not always required or asked to provide 
information on their status. Estimates may also vary according to the methodology used. 
A 1993 survey of five states by the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that "state 
and local governments appear to pay the largest share of costs, approximately 81 per cent, 
of which California pays the most; and that benefits for illegal aliens and their citizen 
children constitute a small, but rising, percentage of some program costs."57 (Figure 2). 
55Daniel James,  Illegal Immigration - An Unfolding Crisis, p. 41. 
56Jim Impoco and Mike Tharp, "Closing the Golden Gate? California tries to give 
back the tired and the poor,"  U.S. News & World Report. November 21, 1994, p. 42. 
"Immigration:  What Changes Should Be Made in United States Immigration 
Policy. 103d Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document 103-19 (Washington D.C.:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 320-336.  Actual excerpt from GAO Report 
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Figure 2a.  $2.9 Billion in Annual Costs for Illegal Aliens and Their Citizen Children in Five 
States. 
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Source for Figures 2a through 2g:  Government Accounting Office, Benefits for Illegal Aliens:  Some 
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8.  Current Efforts 
A national consensus on the issue of immigration appears unlikely. The state of 
California has criticized the federal administration repeatedly for underestimating the 
severity of the immigration problem. Governor Pete Wilson has been accused by some 
for whipping up anti-immigrant feelings throughout the state based on his stance on the 
issue of illegal immigration and support for Proposition 187. Highly controversial, it 
would severely curtail eligibility of illegal immigrants to educational and social services 
in the state of California. Approximately 300,000 school age children would be affected. 
A similar law banning state funds for the education of illegal immigrants in the state of 
Texas was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982.58 Although the 
proposition passed by a comfortable margin of 59 percent to 41 percent in favor, during 
the November 1994 state elections, efforts to implement it are currently on hold pending 
legal action concerning its constitutionality based on the legal precedent established by 
the 1982 Supreme Court decision. Voter breakdown by ethnicity on Proposition 187 
showed that non-Hispanic whites voted 2 to 1 in favor while Hispanics opposed the 
measure 3 to 1. Approval of the measure has touched off widespread rioting and protests, 
along with allegations of racism. 
Public pressure to control the influx of illegal immigrants and drugs across the 
border through increasingly restrictive measures has led the United States to expand the 
role of military and law-enforcement agencies along the border. The "militarization" of 
the border refers to an approach in law enforcement and border control that relies 
increasingly on military expertise, technology, equipment, facilities, strategies and 
personnel.59 A series of congressional and presidential initiatives over the past several 
years based on the threat posed by drug traffickers to national security and bolstered by 
the designation of the border as a "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area" in 1990, have 
58Bob Egelko, "Prop. 187 promises legal tangle," The Monterey Herald. October 
25, 1994, pp. 1A, 10A. 
59 Barry, Browne, and Sims, The Great Divide, p. 74. 
35 
loosened some of the restrictions on the use of armed forces in domestic law enforcement 
under the Posse Comitatus Act.60 The amendments relaxed proscriptions against using 
military equipment and personnel for civilian law enforcement. In addition, the 
Immigration Act of 1990 for the first time authorized the INS to make arrests for any 
violations of the federal law.61 
In 1989 a military unit known as "Joint Task Force Six" at Fort Bliss in El Paso 
was established to coordinate military participation in support of law enforcement 
operations. In addition, National Guard units stationed at various crossing points along 
the border have been used as customs inspectors to conduct searches of private and 
commercial vehicles for contraband. Joint Border Patrol-National Guard task forces have 
patrolled in remote areas. Finally in 1991, Marines helped erect a fence of corrugated 
steel plates along 12 miles of the California border.62 
El Paso, Texas is the nation's second busiest border crossing for illegal aliens, with 
approximately 8,000 crossings a day. In 1993, the Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas 
effectively closed down its portion of the border by forming a blockade manned by 400 
officers positioned at 100-yard intervals. Operation "Blockade" initiated September 19, 
1993 was extended indefinitely under Operation "Hold the Line." Since operations began 
a year ago, apprehensions of illegal aliens have decreased by 72 percent from 122,355 in 
1993 to 34,188 in 1994. Petty theft has also decreased. As a result of Operation "Hold 
the Line," nationwide apprehensions during the first half of 1994 were down 17 percent 
compared to the same period in 1993.63 
Although Operation Hold the Line is being heralded as a success, a closer look at 
the initial statistics presents a more complex picture. During the first month of operations, 
60Ibid. 
61Maria Jimenez, "War in the Borderlands," p. 30. 
62Ibid. 
63Joel Brinkley, "A Success at the Border Earned Only a Shrug", The New York 
Times, September 14, 1994, pp. Al, A9. 
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petty crime experienced a significant reduction of 60 percent to 95 percent in comparison 
to the same period last year. Car thefts also decreased by 20 percent and burglaries by 
20 percent to 48 percent, consistent with the alleged success of the operation. However, 
no major changes were noted in the area of social services. Birth rates, admissions, and 
surgeries at the local public hospital remained unchanged a month after the blockade was 
initiated.64 
In addition, although the operation may have stopped illegal aliens from crossing 
at El Paso, its impact as a deterrent on the overall influx of illegal immigrants across the 
border remains unclear. Instead, illegal aliens are now simply crossing the border 
elsewhere in Texas and New Mexico. Apprehensions elsewhere along the border have 
increased 40 percent since the operation began.65 The same trend was observed in 
response to increased enforcement efforts in the San Diego area by local authorities. 
Although a minor reduction in illegal immigrants was observed, the migratory flux simply 
shifted eastward. Apprehensions in Tucson, Arizona increased 18 percent in 1992 and 30 
percent through-out most of 1993. Likewise, similar increases were also observed in El 
Paso.66 
In July 1993, the Clinton Administration announced its policy on illegal 
immigration. The administration called for a variety of measures or initiatives to be 
funded by a proposed budget of $172.5 million for fiscal year 1994. Officials planned 
to seek approximately half of the proposed amount from increases in various immigration 
user fees. The package would allot $45.1 million for new personnel, approximately 600 
new agents, equipment for the Border Patrol, $45 million to update the State Department's 
overseas visa processing and almost $60 million to improve INS processing. In addition 
"Gerardo Albarran de Alba y Alejandro Gutierrez, "Cifras delictivas y en 
asistencia, reves para el bloqueo fronterizo", Proceso. November 1, 1993, pp. 29-30. 
65Jim Impoco, "Trying to hold back the tide", U.S. News & World Report. October 
3, 1994, p. 40. 
^Gerardo Albarran de Alba y Alejandro Gutierrez, "Cifras delictivas y en 
asistencia, reves para el bloqueo fronterizo," p. 30. 
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to increased funding, administration officials called for "new legal tools to stop fraudulent 
asylum-seekers and to crack down on smugglers who traffic in illegal aliens."67 
Unilateral efforts to curtail or block the movement of illegal immigrants across the 
border have sparked protests from the Mexican government, which has complained that 
Operation Hold the Line created unnecessary tensions that affect the traditionally good 
relationship of the communities on both sides of the border."68 The issue of illegal 
immigration is highly emotive and divisive, not only in terms of interstate relations, but 
also domestically. At heart, it is an issue of economics with moral and social 
implications: "When we were prospering, we closed our eyes to illegal immigration, now 
because times are tough, it is easy to pin the blame on one group."69 
B.  ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
In 1993 the United States and Mexico formally signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), thus setting the stage for closer economic integration. The 
purpose of the agreement is to reduce trading barriers between the United States, Mexico 
and Canada. It is intended to promote economic growth by enhancing global 
competitiveness. Unlike its European counterpart (Maastricht), NAFTA does not create 
a common market for the movement of labor across open borders. Instead, its 
immigration provisions are limited specifically to the reciprocal "temporary entry of 
business persons" to include:   business visitors, traders and investors, intra-company 
67
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Changes Aim to Stop Abuses,", Congressional Quarterly. July 31, 1993, pp. 2082, 
2061. 
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transferees, and certain categories of professionals.70 
Although immigration is not addressed by NAFTA, the impact of the agreement 
on immigration, specially in relation to labor, quickly gained ascendancy as an issue 
during the national debate preceding final Congressional approval. Opponents of 
NAFTA were quick to argue that approval of the agreement would adversely affect both 
the job market and wage levels in the United States, prompting concern in turn that such 
views and statements would be conducive to a backlash of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Some critics also further argued that NAFTA's economic reforms would actually increase 
immigration. In fact, the consensus appears to be that although immigration is expected 
to increase in the short run, in the long run the economic development generated by the 
agreement would reduce the economic incentives currently driving migration. 
The importance of economic development as a prime mover was recognized in 
1990 when the International Commission for the Study of International Migration and 
Cooperative Economic Development (CSIMCED) published a report suggesting that trade 
liberalization would reduce the economic push factors driving migration from the 
Caribbean Basin and Mexico into the United States. It has subsequently been pointed out, 
however, that economic restructuring could in the short run result in the displacement of 
workers within certain sectors of the economy. 
One such area is the agricultural sector where the lowering of tariffs and other 
trade barriers will most likely increase migratory pressures as rural workers become 
displaced.71 However, the extent of this impact is unclear and may not be as severe as 
originally predicted specially if, as is the case, a long transition period of 10 to 15 years 
70Joyce C Vialet, "A North American Free Trade Agreement and Immigration," 
ras Report for Congress, 93-62 EPW, January 15, 1993, pg CRS-5; and Joyce C. 
Vialet, "The North American Free Trade Agreement and Immigration," Migration 
World, Vol XXI, No. 2/3, pp. 25-26. 
7,Dolores Acevedo and Thomas J. Espenshade, "Implications of a North American 
Free Trade Agreement for Mexican Migration into the United States," Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 18, no. 4, Dec 1992, p. 734. 
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is allowed in the phasing out of tariffs on import sensitive agricultural products such as 
corn and beans. Other factors unrelated to trade liberalization such as (1) consistently 
high U.S. employer demands for low-skilled labor, (2) the U.S./Mexico real wage 
differential and (3) other socio-political factors such as the recent decision to allow 
privatization of communally held land (ejidos) are more likely to have a greater short to 
medium term impact on future migration flows.72 
During the 1980s, the wage differential or gap between U.S. and Mexican 
industrial wages, based on per capita domestic products, was estimated to be roughly 10- 
to-1 and is now approximately 7-to-l. However, adjustments reflecting purchasing power 
further reduce the ratio to 3.5-to-l, which is still significant. In addition to per capita 
wage differentials, comparisons between U.S. and Mexican minimum wages yield a ratio 
of 8-to-l. The minimum wage along the Mexican border is only $5 a day, with the 
average maquiladora assembly wage, including benefits, slightly higher at approximately 
$12 a day. In contrast, in 1991 American manufacturing workers earned an average 
hourly wage of $15.45.73 It is unlikely that the wage differential will decline significantly 
in the near future because of the surplus of Mexican labor, which is not expected to 
diminish until the turn of the century. 
The influx of illegal immigrants into the United States is unlikely to decrease 
significantly in the near future. Despite coordinating efforts at the law enforcement level 
the United States continues to pursue a unilateral course of action in an attempt to contain 
the northward flow of illegal immigrants. Efforts to close down the border although 
successful locally, have been counterbalanced by shifts in migratory routes. The 
imposition of employer sanctions mandated by IRCA has also failed to reduce illegal 
72Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L. Martin, "The Uncertain Connection:  Free 
Trade and Rural Mexican Migration to the United States," IMR. Vol XXVII, No. 3, 
Fall 1993, p. 487. 
73William A. Orme, Jr., Continental Shift:  Free Trade and the New North 
America, Briefing Book. (Washington D.C.:  The Washington Post Company, 1993), 
p. 87. 
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immigration. Short term fixes are unlikely to succeed significantly in reducing the overall 
number of immigrants and could be extremely costly in terms of assets, manpower, and 
money. Although legislative measures designed to curb abuses and fraud by limiting 
access to benefits could act as disincentives, such measures tend to engender public 
controversy and may be of questionable constitutionality. 
As long as the economic incentives or push-pull factors persist, the influx of 
immigrants will continue, assisted in part by established migratory routes and networks. 
Preliminary studies indicate that trade liberalization in the long run should reduce 
migratory pressures (Figure 3). Free trade in conjunction with foreign and domestic 
investments are critical to stimulating economic growth and in creating additional jobs 
within the Mexican economy.74 
In the past, the United States has tended to act upon the issue of immigration 
unilaterally. It is a problem, however, that needs to be addressed at a binational level for 
several reasons. Mexican immigrants send home more than $3 billion a year, equal to 
Mexico's earnings from tourism or the entire maquiladora trade.75 Additionally, Mexican- 
Americans comprise the largest group of Hispanics, currently the fastest growing ethnic 
minority in the United States. In 1993 for the first time, according to the U.S. census the 
Hispanic population in San Antonio and Houston, Texas, surpassed the African-American 
population in those cities.76 The growing Hispanic population represents an important 
political constituency which is only just now beginning to flex its political muscle. 
Close cultural and family ties with Mexico are bound to create resentment both in Mexico 
and within the Latin community against unilateral and restrictive policies on Mexican 
74Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L. Martin, "The Uncertain Connection:  Free 
Trade and Rural Mexican Migration to the United States," p. 506. 
"William A. Orme, Jr., Continental Shift:  Free Trade and the New North 
America, p. 223. 
76This information was obtained from a news report on Univision, a Spanish 
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Migration to the United States," IMR, Vol XXVII, No. 3, p. 507. 
Figure 3.  Hypothesized Relationship Between the Number of Mexican Migrants to the 
United States and Time with and without NAFTA. 
immigration, raising accusations of discrimination against American citizens of Mexican 
ancestry. A case in point is the controversy surrounding California's Proposition 187 on 
illegal immigration, which has elicited public statements by various members of the 
Clinton administration as well as President Salinas against the provisions contained within 
the proposition. 
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There continues to be an undisputable demand in the United States for cheap 
migrant labor, particularly in the service and agricultural sectors. In Mexico, immigration 
has long been viewed as an "escape" or "safety" valve, diffusing discontent and 
contributing to the stability of that country, hence there has been little effort to control 
the northward flow of immigrants. An effort must be made, to insure that future policy 
decisions on immigration related issues concerning the U.S.-Mexican border complement 
and are consistent with economic development and integration efforts for the region. As 
the issue of illegal immigration becomes increasingly politicized, it will become more 
difficult for both countries to pursue a unilateral approach to policy decisionmaking. 
Increasingly restrictive measures without proper notification and/or coordination between 
both countries could lead to an escalation of tensions and reactive policymaking. 
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IV.  VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA 
A.  IMMIGRATION 
1.  History and Dynamics 
The border between Colombia and Venezuela is one of the busiest in Latin 
America. As an example, an estimated 120,000 people and over 10,000 vehicles cross 
the border daily through the checkpoint at Peracal in the Venezuelan border state of 
Tachira. One hundred thousand Colombians are employed in the neighboring towns 
alone.77 The border between Colombia and Venezuela is 2,200 km in length (Figure 4). 
Most of it either sparsely populated or heavily forested, particularly along the southwest 
portion. It is by its geography, a relatively porous border, difficult to patrol and control 
effectively. 
The impact of illegal immigration and drug trafficking by Colombians in 
Venezuela, as well as contraband and a host of other associated illegal activities are 
border issues of particular sensitivity to both countries, with national ramifications. The 
actual number of illegal immigrants is unknown but estimates range from 500,000 to as 
high as 2,000,000 of which 70 percent may be Colombians.78 The majority have entered 
the country seeking better economic conditions and higher salaries. Per capita, gross 
national product (GNP), in dollars has traditionally been higher in Venezuela. In 1991, 
the per capita GNP in Venezuela was $2,730 compared to $1,260 in Colombia.79 Inflation 
rates until recently were also lower in Venezuela, where the economy has been artificially 
buoyed by the oil industry.   Prior to 1945, Colombia's higher developmental levels 
77
"Cien mil colombianos trabajan en Urena,"  Dirario El Nacional. Caracas, 
Venezuela, 3 de febrero 1994, p. D/7. 
78Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Venezuela a Country Study, 
(Washington D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 55.  Estimates ranged 
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79World Development Report 1993:  Investing in Health. (New York:  Oxford 
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Figure 4.  Venezuela - Colombia Border. 
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attracted a significant number of Venezuelan migrants. However, this trend was reversed 
with the oil boom following WWII in conjunction with deteriorating conditions in 
Colombia. As a result of the oil boom, new public and private investments generated an 
increased demand for unskilled workers, particularly in the agricultural sector. As 
Venezuelan themselves migrated from the countryside to the cities in search of better jobs, 
Colombian workers began to fill the vacuum created; with smaller numbers migrating to 
the cities and competing with Venezuelans for low-paying jobs in sweatshops and 
domestic or service jobs. 
According to the most recent Venezuelan census (1990) Colombians constitute the 
largest immigrant group in the country (529,924), 51.6 per cent of the total immigrant 
population and 3 per cent of the total overall population, with the largest migrant 













Source:   El Censo 90 en Venezuela, Central de Estadistica e Informatica, OCEI, 1992 
Figure 5.  Distribution of Foreign Born Population. 
80F1 r.f!nsn 90 en Venezuela, Central de Estadistica e Informatica, OCEI, 1992, p. 
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Two border states, Zulia and Tachira, account for roughly 25.5 percent of the population 
with the remainder concentrated within the states along the central northeastern zone: 
Federal District (Caracas), Miranda, Aragua, and Carabobo81 (Figure 6). The large 
concentration of Colombians in the state of Tachira has been attributed to a thriving 
border economy between the cities of San Cristobal in Venezuela and Cucuta in 
Colombia. On the other hand, migration into Zulia occurs largely in response to 









Source:  El Censo 90 en Venezuela, Central de Extadistica e Informatica, OCEI, 1992. 
Figure 6.  Distribution of Colombian Population. 
81 Ibid.,  p. 44. 
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A 1981 breakdown of the Colombian labor force revealed that the majority of 
Colombian males were employed in the agricultural sector (26.1%), with lesser but still 
significant percentages in manufacturing and construction. Colombian women in contrast 
were overwhelmingly employed in the service industry (56.0%) and commerce (17.5%).82 
Since then, the observed trends have varied little, with only a slight decrease noted in the 
percent of males employed and/or residing in rural areas. Between 1981 and 1986, this 
percentage decreased from 30.3 percent to 25.8 percent and has been attributed by some 
sources to a "reverse" migratory trend prompted by worsening economic conditions during 
the 1980s in Venezuela, in conjunction with an increase in urban versus rural migration.83 
Available data suggest that Colombian immigration may have peaked or slowed down 
during the 1980s in response to recessionary pressures and devaluation of the bolivar in 
1983. According to the Direccion Sectorial de Identificacion y Extranjeria (DIEX), 
between 1980 and 1986, approximately 72,932 Colombians legally exited the country 
compared to a net influx of 80,853 during the 1970s.84 It is likely, although difficult to 
ascertain due to the lack of data, that illegal immigration trends have closely paralleled 
those of legal immigration throughout the years.    (Table 4). 
Over the years, both countries have developed legislation to regulate and control 
the flow of immigrants, (see Appendices A and B for list of regulatory controls and 
agreements). However, Colombian authorities have taken a much more passive approach. 
Conversely, since 1965 Venezuela has been deporting increasing numbers of Colombians. 
"Surveys of deported immigrants, obviously illegal, during the 1970s and 1980s typically 
reveal the following profile: predominately male; women account for less than 17 percent; 
82Gabriel Bidegain Greising, ed. Las Migraciones Laborales Colombo-Venezolanas. 
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (ILDIS) y la Universidad 
Catolica Andres Beilo (UCAB), (Caracas:  Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1987), p. 80. 
83Gabriel Bidgain Greising and Anitza Freitez Landaeta,  Colombianos en 
Venezuela:  mito v realidad, Centro de Estudios de Pastoral y Asistencia Migratoria, 
Caracas, 1989, p. 12. 
84Ibid., p. 11. 
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Migratory Flows, Colombians, 1971-86 
Year Total Flow Total Venezuelan Total Immigrants Total Colombian 
1971 38,985 12,187 26,789 10,496 
1972 3,395 -7440 10,835 5,844 
1973 9,738 -12,748 22,522 9,802 
1974 36,137 -17,321 53,458 14,449 
1975 27,015 -9,126 36,141 17,270 
1976 45,017 23,813 21,204 7,589 
1977 -11,766 -64,998 53,232 12,029 
1978 177,843 107,753 70,090 7,845 
1979 5,718 -15,952 21,690 -4,471 
Total 
1971-79 
332,082 16,132 315,941 80,853 
1980 -54,714 -36,557 -18,157 -8585 
1981 -87,025 -50,225 -36,800 -11,869 
1982 -57,969 -34,775 -23,190 -2,836 
1983 8,030 31,543 -23,513 -18,904 
1984 -45,481 -17,307 -28,174 -11,256 
1985 -25,574 -19,304 -6,270 -3,404 
1986 -19,186 6,407 -25,593 -16,074 
Total 
1980-86 
-281,915 -120,218 -161,697 -72,932 
Total 
1971-86 
50,167 -104,086 154,244 7921 
Source:  Lo: i Colombianos en Vene zuela, Annex 1, pg. 11 6 
Table 4.  Migratory Flows, Colombians 1971 - 1986. 
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66 percent are between 20 and 29 years old; 89 percent are younger than 30; two-thirds 
are single; 61 percent are childless; 73.5 percent have six or fewer years of schooling with 
only 5 percent having some technical or professional schooling; 35.9 percent came from 
the rural sector as previously employed agricultural workers and; 27.2 percent were 
factory workers."85 According to this profile, the average illegal immigrant is male, 
young and very likely may have been employed at the time he migrated in search of 
better economic opportunities. 
Whether these surveys are accurate or not in profiling the average illegal 
immigrant, many Venezuelans consider them to be criminal elements. This may be partly 
due to a combination of interacting factors such as cultural bias, possibly introduced in 
response to differing historical experiences, socioeconomic development, and ethnic 
composition. A second factor concerns the period of economic recession experienced 
during the 1980s during which the job market contracted and Venezuelans found 
themselves competing for jobs previously filled by Colombians. Since 1980, real wages 
in Venezuela have declined by 47 percent and 70 percent of the population is considered 
poor with 30 percent living under extreme poverty.86 A third factor influencing public 
perception of Colombian immigrants may be traced to the negative reputation acquired 
by extension from that segment of Colombian society that continues to be engaged in drug 
trafficking and other illicit affairs both domestically and in other countries. Thus there 
is a well-justified fear and concern that drug- related activities may be expanding into 
Venezuela and that one of the avenues used for its expansion into the country is through 
the use of the Colombian immigrant to either smuggle and/or distribute locally. Fourth, 
Venezuela has since the mid 1970s experienced a sustained increase in violent crime 
particularly in major urban areas and along the borders. 
85Alfred Stepan, ed., Americas: New Interpretative Essays (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 262. 
86T l6Roundup of Economic Developments 7 Dec. FBIS-LAT-93-235, p. 60. The 
figures cited were provided by a Venezuelan Economist from the Central Bank of 
Venezuela. 
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2.   Crime 
Currently, Venezuela has one of the highest crime rates in Latin America with an 
average of 72 homicides per week; a bank robbery every two days; and four homicides 
among prison inmates every twenty-four hours.87 Rural crime confined mostly to the 
border consist mainly of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, occasional kidnappings 
perpetrated by Colombian guerrillas, and contraband. The theft of vehicles across the 
border has also been on the increase (Figure 7). Both countries have been working 
together to reduce the contraband of stolen vehicles across the border. Recently, a 
tentative agreement was reached in which no Colombian would be able to purchase a 
vehicle in Venezuela without proper registration documents.88 
In addition, border agents must also deal with contraband. For example, one of 
the most lucrative forms of contraband involves gasoline. It is estimated that up to 3,000 
vehicles are involved, most of them registered in Venezuela. Gas tanks are modified and 
enlarged to accommodate up to 1,200 liters. Gasoline is routinely purchased in Venezuela 
for approximately 5 bolivares and resold across the border at 25 bolivares.89 As a result, 
a form of clandestine commerce has evolved surrounding this contraband, with children 
usually employed to advertise the sale and purchase of gasoline as one crosses the border. 
Prostitution is also common along the border towns. It is estimated that in Cucuta there 
are more than 3,000 brothels and 12,000 prostitutes. Most prostitutes are recruited 
through a local contact in Colombia and enter the country at San Cristobal travelling 
from there to Caracas, Merida, Maracaibo, or Cucuta.90 
87
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Auto Thefts, 1979-88 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Reported 
cases 
22,796 23,413 20,036 20,613 18,931 14,482 17,431 22,296 25,512 29,093 
PHTI 168.67 168.28 129.39 129.32 115.48 85.94 100.66 125.32 139.62 155.10 
Figure 7. Auto Thefts, 1979 - 1988. 
Urban crime on the other hand is motivated by high unemployment rates, lack of 
opportunity and drugs. The United States has the largest concentration of Colombian 
prisoners and Venezuela the second largest with approximately 2, 806, of which 95 
percent are doing time for drug related crimes.91 Concern over the growing numbers of 
Colombian inmates housed in Venezuelan prisons prompted both countries to engaged in 
a series of bilateral negotiations which culminated in an agreement for the repatriation of 
prisoners. The final draft of this agreement was signed on January 20,1994 and provided 
for the relocation of 1500 Colombian prisoners and only two Venezuelan prisoners.92 
Colombia was unable to accept all prisoners due to limited prison space. 
3.  Government Corruption and Fraud 
Complaints of mistreatment from Colombians in Venezuela have increased. 
During a November 1993 interview, one of the Colombian presidential candidates, 
91
 "Se firmara acuerdo de repatriacion de presos colombianos,"  Diario 2001, 
Editorial de Armas, Caracas, Venezuela. 7 de enero 1994, p. 7 
92 !Ibid. 
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Navarro Wolff representing the Alianza Democratica M-19 de Colombia (ADM-19) 
accused the Venezuelan National Guard with charging illegal immigrants 40,000 bolivares 
to legalize their presence and anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 bolivares to overlook any 
inconsistencies with their paperwork.93 Coincidentally, a report released by a Catholic 
diocese in Cucuta during the same period of time stated that of 2,200 deportees processed 
up through November 1993 at a local deportation center under their auspices, the majority 
asserted that they had paid intermediaries and/or Venezuelan authorities for illegal entry.94 
Although Mr. Wolffs comments were generally downplayed by senior 
government officials, there are individuals that are benefitting from or at the expense of 
immigrants. Recently, a busload of twenty Ecuadorian immigrants was stopped for 
illegally attempting to enter the country at a Venezuelan border crossing in the state of 
Tachira. The immigrants were being charged the equivalent of 500 U.S. dollars per 
person for being brought across the border into Venezuela illegally.95 Indications are that 
an extensive black market has emerged in the traffic of illegal immigrants including the 
active solicitation of labor in Colombia; transport; sale of fraudulent documents; and very 
often exploitative practices involving early deportation as a tactic for avoiding salary 
payments in what amounts to slave labor. The extent to which elements of the National 
Guard may be involved in this and other illegal activities is uncertain due to lack of 
information although accusations abound. 
The difficulty in enforcing control and accountability of immigrants creates the 
potential for fraud and abuse as was manifested during the December 1993 elections in 
Venezuela when allegations were made by a local deputy that an electoral organization 
known as Venezuela-2, founded in 1968 by former members of the Social Christian Party 
(Partido Social Cristiano, COPEI) and the Democratic Action Party (Accion Democratica, 
93
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AD), was being used as a front to recruit and register illegally as many as 12,000 voters 
of dubious Venezuelan nationality residing across the border in Colombia. The allegations 
were based on the fact that records indicated numerous instances of duplicate and 
nonexistent addresses.96 
4.  Immigrant Abuse 
Amnesty International and Americas Watch both released reports on human rights 
in Venezuela for 1993. Although Colombians and immigrants in general were not singled 
out in the reports, police brutality and an inadequate prison system were cited as sources 
of ongoing human rights abuses in the country. Venezuelan prisons are overcrowded and 
inmates are not segregated based on the severity of their crimes or by ethnicity, as a result 
prison riots are not uncommon. A series of prison riots during January 1994 at the 
Maracaibo National jail instigated by ethnic feuds left 106 prisoners dead.97 It is 
important to remember that Venezuela's prison system houses the second largest 
population of Colombian inmates outside that country. 
The illegal entry of Colombians into Venezuelan territory engaged in suspicious 
activities has in the past prompted border incidents involving allegations by Colombian 
authorities on the questionable use of force by the Venezuelan National Guard. Such was 
the case in October 1988 when members of the Comando Especifico General en Jefe Jose 
Antonio Paez (CEJAP), a special military-police unit responsible for monitoring the 
Colombian-Venezuelan border, shot to death fourteen Colombians, believed to be 
guerrillas, while on a fishing excursion near El Amparo, in southwestern Venezuela. 
CEJAP was created in 1987 to combat criminal activities along the border and has since 
been disestablished as a result of this incident. The case was tried in a military court and 
in 1993 the defendents were found guilty of intentional homicide and sentenced to seven- 
96
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and-a-half years in prison.98 Perhaps one of the most disturbing accusations concerned 
the supposed discovery of the remains of approximately 400 Colombian laborers reported 
missing throughout a period of 10 months in 1979 in the border state of Amazonas." The 
majority of complaints, however, range from illegal deportations and incarceration to 
physical and/or verbal abuse, and in some rare instances outright torture. 
5.  Drug Trafficking 
Although Venezuela is not a major producer of drugs, it is an important 
transshipment area not only for drugs but also for precursor chemicals used in the 
distillation process. Traditionally, drug trafficking in Venezuela has been largely confined 
to the shipment of drugs to overseas markets primarily the U.S. and Europe; financial 
management; and money laundering. Since 1988, increased cultivation of marijuana has 
been noted in the northwest border region with Colombia (the Perija Mountains), while 
coca cultivation remains limited. Anti-drug efforts for the region are coordinated from 
the National Guard headquarters in Maracaibo. According to Venezuelan authorities, 
Colombians have been crossing the border into the sparsely populated area to cultivate 
both marijuana and coca.  The leaves are then moved back to Colombia for processing. 
Starting in the mid-1980s, the National Guard intensified efforts to block 
shipments and local production by instituting search and destroy missions in the Seirra de 
Perija. Although illegal immigrants have been known to serve as mules, transporting 
drugs in and out of the country, the drug trafficking activities along the border are also 
closely linked with narco-guerillas. In 1987, a group of nine guardsmen were killed and 
10 wounded, all members of an anti-drug unit, in an ambush believed to be in retaliation 
for the guard's destruction of a 320 acre marijuana and coca farm discovered in the area. 
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Responsibility of the attack was traced to Colombian narco-guerillas.100 
In 1992, the U.S. noted that illicit cultivation of coca has also been occurring in 
the mountain regions where Venezuela borders Colombia. Coca cultivation has also been 
sighted near Puerto Ayacucho in the vicinity of the Orinoco River in the border state of 
Amazonas. United States government sources attribute the increase in cultivation of 
marijuana to an effective eradication program on the Colombian side of the border. 
Venezuela, unlike Colombia, has not used herbicides to eradicate either coca or marijuana 
farming. The cocaine which is transshipped from Venezuela originates primarily in 
Colombia, 75 percent of which is destined for the U.S. market. In 1988, the DEA 
estimated that 15 tons to 20 tons of cocaine transited Venezuela each year. Since then, 
according to DOD officials, the amount has quadrupled.101 Venezuela is also important 
to Colombian cocaine producers because it is a major chemical transshipment country. 
Twenty nine percent of all chemicals legally exported by U.S. chemical companies to 
Latin America flow through Venezuela.102 
Drug trafficking impacts upon society in a variety of ways. Although statistics on 
local consumption were unavailable, several of the articles used in this research allude to 
an increase in use. As mentioned previously, the crime rate, particularly violent crime, 
has continued to increase over the last several years. Drug related offenses between 1979 
and 1988 doubled reaching a peak in 1985. Although the increase in crime may be 
attributed in part to the expansion of Colombian drug cartels into the country, severe 
economic conditions experienced throughout the 1980s may have also contributed to the 
observed trend.   It is interesting to note that during the timeframe for which there is data, 
100Merril Collett, "Venezuela blames raid on Marxists." Washington Post. June 18, 
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both unemployment and drug offenses in Colombia and Venezuela peaked in the same 
year, 1985.  (Figures 8 and 9). 
Drug Offenses, 1979-1988 
- 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Reported Cases 2,849 4,038 4,296 4,378 4,371 5,212 6,172 6,125 5,927 5,424 
PHTI 21.08 29.02 27.74 27.47 26.66 30.93 35.64 34.43 32.65 28.61 
Source:  Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 29. 
Figure 8.  Drug Offenses, 1979-1988 
Open Unemployment, 1980-1989 (%) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Colombia 9.1 8.1 9.1 11.1 13.1 14.0 13.0 11.1 10.1 8.9 
Venezuela 6.2 6.4 7.1 9.8 13.4 13.1 11.0 9.1 7.7 8.7 
Figure 9.  Open Unemployment, 1980 - 1989. 
Drugs are smuggled into the country in a variety of ways. Often they are 
smuggled across the border through checkpoints in vehicles or by human carriers/mules. 
The new customs union implemented in 1991, allows tractor trucks to travel largely 
untaxed and unchecked between the two countries.103 The large volume of traffic and 
crossings at some of the busiest checkpoints, which are traditionally understaffed, favor 
the smuggler who is less likely to be stopped or inspected under these conditions.   Air 
103James Brooke, "Venezuela's Open Border Speeds Drug Traffic," New York 
Times, November 5, 1992, p. A13. 
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drops are also common. The border between Venezuela and Colombia is difficult to 
guard and relatively porous. Geography and the environment again favor the smuggler 
who is able to cross from one country to another with minimal risk of detection by taking 
advantage of the dense vegetation and remoteness of the region. For example, shipments 
of cocaine disguised as coffee crossing the Orinoco River into Venezuela have been 
reported by visitors to the Colombian border state of Vichada. Drug interdiction efforts 
along the border are also hindered by: changing smuggling patterns traffickers adjust their 
modes and routes in response to detection, monitoring, interdiction operations; insufficient 
resources; poor interagency/law enforcement cooperation; and corruption. 
6.  Current Efforts 
The scope of the illegal immigration problem is almost overwhelming. For 
example, in the Venezuelan state of Bolivar out of a population of an estimated 46,000 
immigrants only 6,000 have proper documentation. In some border areas, Colombian 
immigrants may outnumber Venezuelans 15 to l.104 The prospect of increasing numbers 
of immigrants residing and working within border states, particularly in sparsely populated 
areas where they may easily outnumber the local population, has the potential for serious 
political and social unrest; and may be perceived by some as a form of Colombian 
expansionism and a threat to the integrity and national security of the country. In an 
attempt to slow down illegal immigration which has become a drain on public resources, 
the government of Venezuela under the Velasquez administration nullified Decree 1911. 
Decree 1911, instituted during the Perez administration, guaranteed Venezuelan 
citizenship to children born of illegal immigrants in Venezuelan territory.105 As in the 
United States, it is believed by many that this avenue for citizenship has provided an 
incentive for pregnant women to illegally cross the border in order to have their children 
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bora to a different citizenship in the hopes that they and their children will benefit from 
this opportunity. Perceptions like this, have been further reinforced by studies similar to 
the one conducted in the border state of Tachira which linked 17 percent of births, 
between October 1991 and March 1992, with citizenship requests by Colombian illegal 
immigrants.106 
It is unclear to what degree the rise and fall of xenophobic sentiment is linked to 
migratory fluxes and prevailing economic conditions in Venezuela. Although no data 
were available to substantiate claims or allegations of fraud and abuse by immigrants of 
social services, concern over alleged abuses is clearly reflected in the press coverage. 
Access to recent press headlines on the topic of immigration from domestic sources has 
been limited. However, a cursory review of available references does reveal instances of 
anti-immigrant feeling. Despite this, both countries appear to be making a concerted 
effort to initiate a joint or bilateral approach in seeking a solution for the problem of 
illegal immigration. 
B.  ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Notwithstanding a history of border incidents, significant progress has been made 
over the years on identifying and attempting to resolve border related problems and 
disputes through an ongoing dialogue. There is mutual recognition of the strategic and 
national security significance that the border represents to both countries and of the 
benefits to be gained by pursuing a bilateral approach to problem solving through various 
committees and commissions such as the Colombia-Venezuela Bilateral Border 
Commission and the Border Ingration Commission; as well as the broad ramifications that 
failure to resolve these issues would pose to both countries. 
Initial attempts to regulate commerce along the border, beginning in the 1950s, 
were hindered by political instability in both countries and a lack of consistency in policy 
development and application.    Subsequent attempts during the 1960s and 1970s at 
106
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economic regional integration failed to achieve the desired results (Asociacion 
Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC), Pacto Andino, and Acuerdo de Cartagena) 
possibly due to unrealistic expectations and a lack of political commitment. However, the 
emergence of trading blocs during the late 1980s and 1990s and their perceived success 
in promoting regional and economic development has created renewed interest in regional 
integration and multilateral/bilateral accords. 
The framework for current and future bilateral accords between Colombia and 
Venezuela was set in the Acuerdo de Caracas (1989) which directed and authorized the 
formation of a series of bilateral commissions, Comisiones de Vecindad, and committees 
to study the economic and social development of the border region. The structure, 
functions, and responsibilities of the respective commissions were delineated subsequently 
by the Declaracion de Urena later that same year. As an outgrowth, the following 
recommendations were made: 1) the formation of Zones of Border Integration or Zonas 
de Integration Fronteriza (ZIF), involving the integration of basic infrastructures. Closely 
linked with the adoption of ZIFs was the additional recommendation on the formation 
of a mixed commission to monitor immigration related issues and problems and 2) 
The construction and operation of a series of Centros Nationales de Atencion Fronteriza, 
CENAF. Located at or near major border crossings, these centers would serve to 
coordinate the efforts of the various agencies involved in the control and regulation of 
border traffic. Two such centers have already been constructed and at least three others 
have been proposed.108 It was generally recognized that further integration would require 
close coordination or harmonization of existing or future regulations. 
The conditions for establishing free trade between both countries originated within 
the framework of the Andean Pact in which four member countries including Colombia 
and Venezuela agreed in principle to remove all existing trade barriers. In a subsequent 
107Liliana Obregon y Carlos Nasi.  Colombia-Venezuela:  conflicto o integracion. 
(Bogota:  Fundacion Friedrich Ebert de Colombia (FESCOL), 1990), pp. 50-53. 
108Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
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group summit, the heads of state agreed on the establishment, as of January 1, 1992, of 
the Andean Free Trade Area (FTA). The FTA would operate on the basis of uniform 
external tariff levels ranging from 5 to 20 percent.109 Consistent with this agreement, 
Colombia and Venezuela have taken steps designed to reduce and eliminate intra-group 
tariffs mediated through a series of bilateral agreements. In accordance with the above 
agreements, a customs union was established in 1992. As a result of this arrangement, 
trade between Colombia and Venezuela has quadrupled since 1991, reaching $2 billion 
in 1993.110 Additional agreements have been signed, all aimed at increasing the level of 
integration along the border. 
Internal conflict and dissension among member nations of the Andean Pact may 
have been a factor in the recent agreement signed between Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Mexico (G-3 nations). This agreement provides an alternative path for furthering 
integration between both countries. The agreement signed by Presidents Velasquez 
(Venezuela), Gaviria (Colombia), and Salinas (Mexico) on 20 January 1994, provides for 
the gradual reduction of customs duties over a period of 10 years for all products with the 
exception of automotive and agricultural products which are addressed separately."1 The 
new market is expected to affect approximately 150 million potential consumers.112 For 
Venezuela, this agreement provides the opportunity to diversify its economic base and 
perhaps expand into the North American market through Mexico. For Colombia, it 
provides the opportunity to sell coal to Mexico. Colombian coal would allow Mexico to 
divert increasing amounts of oil from local consumption to exportations, thus increasing 
revenues. 
109Jimmy Weiskopf, "Trading Partners,"  Americas. V44, n 1, Jan-Feb 1992, p. 48. 
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The integration process has provided a forum for the discussion of border issues. 
There has been a legitimate concern that these issues could slow down and derail the 
process. Both governments have been active in promoting the free trade agreement (FTA) 
with Mexico and in allaying some of the reservations and concerns expressed by various 
sectors. One of the most common reservations, concerns the large disparity in the relative 
size of the economies involved and the lack of balancing mechanisms. The Mexican GNP 
is approximately six times that of Colombia and Venezuela. This concern is similar to 
that voiced by some Mexicans in reference to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
Since the signing of the agreement, efforts have been hindered by a major banking 
and financial crisis in Venezuela. Shortly after taking power in February 1994, President 
Rafael Caldera was forced to take drastic measures and suspend constitutional provisions 
of freedom of economic activity without government restrictions. Action was taken in 
response to what the government perceived as an economic and financial emergency. 
Inflation rates in Venezuela have been hovering at 40 percent to 45 percent and the 
country is in the throes of a major banking crisis. The last suspension of economic 
liberties lasted 30 years and was revoked in 1991.1'3 It is yet unclear what effect this will 
have on the further implementation of economic liberalization policies agreed upon under 
the new free trade agreement and existing bilateral agreements. 
Border dynamics between Colombia and Venezuela have varied over the years and 
in response to a series of interacting variables which tend to exacerbate existing tensions. 
The problems of illegal immigration, drug smuggling and contraband are all intertwined. 
These problems are not unique to the border but occur either in response to other external 
factors, or are in themselves manifestation of underlying social problems which are shared 
by both countries but highlighted by these activities. Human beings have traditionally 
migrated in response to changing economic, social, or environmental conditions. Such 
patterns are evident within individual countries, as in the case of urban migration.  On a 
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broader scale, the crossing of borders by large groups of human beings has historically 
been well documented and can be observed currently throughout the world. In the case 
of Colombia and Venezuela, as in the U.S. and Mexico, economic factors appear to be 
the main driving mechanism for large scale immigration. 
Both countries have been engaged throughout the years in negotiations to resolve 
some of these problems. There is a mutual recognition of the need for cooperation. Old 
antagonisms and mutual distrust can occasionally hinder and complicate this process. 
Unfortunately, several of the problems being dealt with are in turn manifestations of other 
social, political, and economic problems plaguing the individual societies. Any proposal 
that is put forth, must also address at some level the internal variables that are acting upon 
and exacerbating the problems that are being experienced along the border and by 
extension affecting the countries as a whole. There may be a tendency to focus on the 
externalities of the problem without examining the conditions that contribute to its growth. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be no literature readily available on the efforts that have 
been made to create disincentives, counteract, and discourage these problems locally. 
The integration process, by hopefully improving the relative economic standards between 
the two countries, could in the long run reduce the level of immigration and contraband. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The process of economic integration raises interesting questions for existing 
interstate relations by potentially increasing the level of interdependence. Historically, the 
relationship between the United States and Mexico has been described as one of 
dependency based on the level of U.S. economic activity in Mexico. A Mexican 
developmental strategy of import substitution emphasizing industrial development at the 
expense of social development further reinforced this dependency.114 
Although it is true that Mexico is the United State's third largest trading partner, 
and the United States Mexico's largest trading partner, such a view fails to take into 
account the complexity of the relationship which includes issues of mutual interest. 
"Intermestic issues", or issues that cross national boundaries, include not only economic 
concerns but also other issues such as drug trafficking, immigration, and the 
environment.115 As a result, issues that have traditionally been considered domestic are 
increasingly acquiring foreign policy implications. And conversely, foreign policy issues 
are increasingly viewed as domestic issues. 
Strong bilateral ties fostered by economic integration and a host of common 
interests suggest that the relationship between the United States and Mexico can best be 
described in terms of an evolving complex interdependency, characterized by reciprocity. 
Transactions between both countries are therefore likely to invoke, depending on the issue, 
a reciprocal effect which may or may not be mutually beneficial. The relationship can 
further be defined as one of asymmetry, with the United States the dominant partner. 
114Judith Adler Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, (New York:  Holmes & Meier 
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According to Abraham Lowenthal, the relationship between the two countries can best be 
described in terms of proximity, interpenetration, and asymmetry.116 
Bruce M. Bagley further expands on the notion of asymmetry and its implications 
for U.S.-Mexican relations. According to Bagley, asymmetrical interdependency, in 
practice, has provided Mexico with bargaining power through the use of linkage politics 
while at the same time constraining the United States from using its power due to the 
degree of interconnectedness. As a result, Mexico has been able to enjoy a certain degree 
of flexibility and autonomy.117 This analysis is consistent with the politics of 
interdependence as described by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in Power and 
Interdependence.''8 However, many Mexicans continue to view their relationship as one 
of dependence based on historical precedence. Whether this is correct or not, the 
perception of dependency can and has influenced to some extent Mexican foreign policy 
decisions within the context of U.S.-Mexican relations. 
Although the relationship between Venezuela and Colombia appears to be less well 
developed as a complex interdependency, several of the same generalizations on 
interdependent processes and characteristics can still be applied. Both countries are 
currently in the initial stages of implementing a free trade agreement with Mexico that 
will formally integrate their economies in a manner similar to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Unlike the United States and Mexico, both countries have 
had an ongoing history of unresolved and conflictive border disputes with potentially 
serious national security and military implications. For example, in 1987, an incursion 
by a Colombian corvette into the disputed Gulf of Venezuela came perilously close to 
116Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict:  The United States and Latin 
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66 
precipitating an armed conflict. As a result, efforts at mutual cooperation continue to be 
strained by conflicting and/or competing interests. Notwithstanding the sensitivity of 
border related issues in terms of national security, economic integration along the border 
has been an ongoing and largely unregulated process promoted by the influx of 
Colombian immigrants, creating in the process a thriving border economy. 
As the channels connecting Venezuela and Colombia multiply and strengthen, the 
degree of interdependence should increase. The relatively close size of the economies 
involved, as compared to the U.S.-Mexico, and comparable military force structures, 
suggests that the interdependent relationship that is currently evolving will be more evenly 
balanced and less asymmetrical than the relationship observed between the United States 
and Mexico. 
As mentioned previously in the introduction, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye have characterized the relationship between complex interdependency and power in 
terms of two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability.119 In the case of the United 
States and Venezuela, both governments have chosen to address the problem of illegal 
immigration within the framework of existing policies rather than implement substantive 
changes. This approach is consistent with the definition of sensitive interdependence in 
which the costs of operating within existing policies outweigh the costs of altering those 
same policies as well as the political willingness to change. 
The influx of large numbers of illegal immigrants and its attendant costs have 
contributed to heightening, in both cases, the host country's sensitivity to immigration, 
prompting an increased demand for new policies which may or may not increase 
vulnerability based on socio-political constraints. If in fact, the dynamics of asymmetrical 
interdependence provide a power basis, then the host or dominant country's sensitivity to 
immigration, or other issues, can be exploited or used as leverage to obtain concessions 





As mentioned previously, the use of linkage policies or strategies has been used 
by Mexico to obtain concessions from the United States in the past, and may have also 
been a factor in the negotiation process involving NAFTA and the G-3 accord. When 
NAFTA was first discussed, critics and advocates urged that it be broadened to address 
mutual immigration concerns. However, President Bush's administration warned that any 
overt linkage to more open immigration could undermine passage of the package through 
Congress, and instead urged President Salinas to sell NAFTA as a solution to Mexican 
immigration, without specifically addressing immigration reforms.121 
It is unclear to what extent linkage strategies have been used by either Venezuela 
and Colombia in addressing issues of common interest such as immigration and drug 
trafficking. Both countries have been in the process in recent years of establishing 
bilateral commissions to study these issues and to make joint recommendations. 
Economic integration within the framework of a free trade agreement should increase the 
likelihood for the use of such strategies by raising the level of interdependence between 
the two countries. 
Increasing politicization of immigration-related issues has succeeded in bringing 
it, at times, to the forefront of the political agenda. In addition, the progressive overlap 
observed between domestic and foreign policy concerns can create a bureaucratic 
nightmare making the formulation of policy that much more difficult. Pressure for 
change by special interest or domestic groups as well as by transnational or 
nongovernmental organizations, across multiple channels, informal and formal, further add 
to the complexities of the relationship by enhancing the prospect of transnational 
coalitions. Hence, immigrant networks can be used effectively to mobilize support across 
national boundaries on issues that are germane to that community or ethnic group. 
Mobilization of this scale was evident in October and November 1994, north and south 
of the U.S.-Mexican border,  in response to  California's Proposition  187,  which 
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precipitated widespread protests from a variety of groups. In Venezuela, the condition 
of Colombian prisoners and concern over abuses against immigrants has prompted several 
human right organizations, including the Church, to intervene and issue reports on their 
status critical of the Venezuelan government. However, the level of political organization 
among Colombian immigrants in Venezuela appears not to be as highly developed as in 
the United States nor are there as many channels of communication or transnational 
linkages. 
Both sets of countries appear to conform, to some extent, with the complex 
interdependent model of interstate relations as described by Keohane and Nye. A 
comparative analysis of both case studies is provided below, focusing on the issue of 
immigration, associated problems, and their impact on interstate relations within the 
context of interdependency. 
B.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In the case of the United States and Mexico, as in Venezuela and Colombia, 
economic factors appear to be the main driving mechanism for large scale immigration. 
Several parallels can be drawn between these two sets of countries and the problems that 
are being experienced along their respective borders as the result of, or in relation to, the 
influx of illegal immigrants. 
1.  Illegal Immigration 
Various analogies can be made as to the processes and dynamics involved. 
Geographic proximity as well as economic and cultural linkages have facilitated the 
movement of immigrants across the respective borders. Geographic constraints governing 
accessibility have limited the ability of both governments to fully control the flow of 
immigrants and drugs across the border. Efforts have been further hampered by 
inadequate resources and budgetary constraints. 
The organizational approach, however, differs in each case as a function of 
national security concerns and priorities. As opposed to the United States, border control 
efforts in Venezuela fall under the purview or authority of the National Guard.   In 
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response to national security concerns, the border between Venezuela and Colombia has 
an added military dimension which is lacking in the case of the United States and Mexico. 
In the United States, existing laws preclude the direct use of military assets in this 
capacity with the exception of training and surveillance. Border control in the United 
States is a function of the Border Patrol, under the jurisdiction of the Department Justice. 
However, the increasing use of military assets, even in a limited manner, has raised 
concerns, both in the United States and Mexico, over the possible "militarization" of the 
U.S.-Mexican border. 
Another dimension to the problem of illegal immigration concerns immigrant 
rights and abuses. Regardless of their legal status, immigrant rights are a concern shared 
by both Mexican and Colombian authorities. Actual abuses and/or allegations of such by 
enforcement agencies have prompted formal complaints through diplomatic channels. The 
scope of this problem appears to be more severe in Venezuela. Throughout Latin 
America, the Church has traditionally played an important role in advocating immigrant 
rights and documenting abuses in the absence of organizational oversight and 
accountability. Additional oversight is also provided by a series of nongovernmental 
organizations with a focus on human rights. Reports issued by these organizations have 
been critical of both the United States and Venezuela on the treatment of immigrants and 
human rights abuses. 
Illegal immigration is intrinsically linked with economic factors that propel 
migratory fluxes. Demand for low-wage, unskilled labor in the agricultural and service 
sectors continues to attract migrant labor. Comparatively higher wages and better 
standards of living, the result of a marked difference in economic development, also act 
as driving mechanisms. Migratory trends have therefore varied in response to economic 
and political conditions. In the case of Venezuela, Colombian immigration is a relatively 
recent phenomena fueled by the oil boom of the 1960s and 1970s. Various sources 
indicate that declining economic conditions in Venezuela during the 1980s have 
precipitated a reverse migration among legal immigrants. In the absence of contradictory 
data, the assumption has been that the same trend is occurring with the illegal population. 
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Current migratory trends in the United States were established during the 
nineteenth century and have been reinforced since World War II. Given the marked 
difference in economies, and the consistently high demand for migrant labor, it is unlikely 
that migratory patterns in the United States will change drastically in the near future. 
Trade liberalization policies are not expected, in either case, to have a significant impact 
on immigration in the short run and may, in fact, produce slight increases in response to 
internal adjustments. 
Declining and/or mixed economic conditions have contributed to a pervasive sense 
of insecurity among the general workforce. In Venezuela, rising unemployment rates have 
reduced the number of jobs available to both legal and illegal immigrants. Although 
unemployment in the United States has remained relatively low, a weak recovery has 
failed to improve real wages. In fact, according to the U.S. government, last year real 
median household income fell by $312, while a million more people slipped into 
poverty.122 Concern over jobs and wages, in both the United States and Venezuela, has 
contributed to creating a backlash against illegal immigration by focusing increasing 
attention on the costs of immigration. This has prompted an increasing demand for 
restrictive measures aimed at curbing access, by illegal immigrants, to most welfare 
programs and benefits. In the United States, measures restricting or barring access to 
welfare programs have been initiated primarily by those states affected by illegal 
immigration. Federal response to public concern, in contrast, has been to emphasized the 
enforcement and control aspects of illegal immigration by increasing the allocation of 
resources along the border. The issue of burden sharing and legislative responsibility, has 
led some of the affected states to sue the federal government in an attempt to ease the 
economic burden of illegal immigration. 
Likewise, in Venezuela, public concern and outcry over rising costs prompted the 
government to nullify Decree 1911,  granting citizenship to children born in Venezuela 
,22George J. Church, "We're #1 and It Hurts," Time, Vol 144, No. 17, October 24, 
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of illegal immigrants, in an effort to deter immigrant fraud and abuses of government 
services. The decree, signed into effect in 1991, was blamed with exacerbating illegal 
immigration and the consequent social deterioration. Its nullification in 1992 strained 
relations between Venezuela and Colombia at a critical time, when both countries were 
in the process of finalizing negotiations on the G-3 accord. It did not, however, derail 
or slow down the process, an indication of the importance placed by both countries on this 
accord and its expected benefits. 
Unlike the United States, in Venezuela the absence of a state income tax system 
and a highly centralized government under a strong executive have combined to 
discourage inconsistencies between local and federal government policies by limiting state 
autonomy, especially on issues which impinge upon national security. Differing levels 
of response observed between the United States and Venezuela on the issue of 
immigration may be ascribed in part to differences in the assessment of national security 
implications, as well as structural differences within the respective governments. 
Mexican and Colombian response has typically been critical of efforts aimed at 
controlling illegal immigration through increasingly restrictive policies. However, to date, 
most of the criticism has been largely confined to diplomatic posturing and/or public 
statements aimed at conveying disapproval. Efforts to restrict the flow of Mexican illegal 
immigrants across the border through the use of barrier methods and/or increased 
enforcement assets has raised concerns over the safety and rights of Mexican citizens, as 
well as American citizens of Hispanic ethnicity who are prone to be stopped and 
questioned, raising allegations of racism. The same label has been applied to legislative 
measures aimed at curbing access to welfare and educational benefits. 
Comments by Mexican diplomats suggesting that Mexico would consider using 
economic sanctions against California, in retaliation for Proposition 187, may reflect a 
shift in the interactive process between the United States and Mexican in response to 
economic integration. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico warned that the 
expanding trade between the two countries could become a tragic casualty of the 
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proposition.123 With trade between Mexico and California totalling approximately $16 
billion a year, the use of economic sanctions or boycott, although unlikely, would 
certainly have an adverse impact on the Californian economy, but would ultimately 
accomplish little in improving the plight of illegal immigrants as well as undermine 
integration efforts.124 Thus, assuming a rational actor, the use of linkage policies in this 
case, should be balanced by the mutual recognition of joint gains and losses. This is 
consistent with a recent statement by President Salinas, who has downplayed the threat 
of economic sanctions in response to Proposition 187, in which he said, "We do not have 
the means, faced with a domestic decision, to promote a sanction in material terms".125 
In contrast, a more restrained or moderate Colombian response to the nullification 
of Decree 1911 may have been dictated in part by timing. Heightened tensions in 
response to the downing of a Venezuelan helicopter in Colombian territory just weeks 
prior to the signing of the G-3 accord, in January 1994, were downplayed by both 
Venezuelan and Colombian authorities.126 It would therefore seem plausible that the 
nullification of Decree 1911 may have also been downplayed in response not only to the 
ongoing negotiations concerning the G-3 accord, but also in response to other political 
concerns. In addition, the use of political leverage may have been constrained in this case 
due to the lack of a well developed interdependency as opposed to the case of the United 
States and Mexico. 
123Tim Golden, "Salinas Urges Talks on Free Migrant Flow," New York Times. 
November 14, 1994, p. A10. 
124CNN Headline News, 6 November 1994. On Mexican reaction to Proposition 
187. 
125Jim Golder, "Salinas Urges Talks on Free Migrant Flow," p. A10. 
126
"Colombia asegura que Venezuela violo su espacio aereo y causo danos 
materiales,"  Diario 2001. Editorial de Armas, Caracas, Venezuela, Jan 13, 1994, p. 7. 
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2.  Drug Trafficking/Crime 
Mexico and Venezuela have over the years evolved into major transhipment 
countries or staging areas for the movement of drugs. In both cases, the drug trade has 
become linked to some degree with the smuggling, or illegal transportation of aliens, 
across the border. To what extent both activities are linked is difficult to ascertain. What 
is clear is the link between drugs and criminal activity. In both the United States and 
Venezuela, criminal activity committed by aliens, irrespective of nationality, has escalated. 
Half of the arrests in the United States involving aliens have been for drug related 
offenses.127 Similar high rates of drug related criminal activity have also been observed 
in Venezuela among the immigrant population, where the majority of Colombian 
prisoners, which comprise approximately 10 percent of the inmate population in 
Venezuela, have been arrested for drug- related crimes. 
As the incidence of crime has escalated, the level of violence along the U.S.- 
Mexican border has increased dramatically. Border Patrol agents now routinely carry 
handguns, on and off duty. Semiautomatic handguns, shotguns, and M-16s are just some 
of the other weapons also issued, although their use is strictly controlled. Changes 
introduced by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 1990 Immigration Act enhanced the 
role of the Border Patrol in drug interdiction by extending the authority of the Border 
Patrol to make arrests. In addition to having the authority to make arrests for the 
violations of U.S. immigration laws, INS agents now also have the authority to make 
arrests for any offense against the United States, provided that offense was committed in 
the officer's presence.128 
Violence across the Venezuelan-Colombian border has a slightly different 
connotation.  In Venezuela, the link between drug trafficking and narcoguerillas adds a 
127John Tanton and Wayne Lutton, "Immigration and Criminality in the U.S.S.," 
The Journal of Social. Political and Economic Studies, Vol 18, N 2, Summer 1993, p. 
217. 
128Americas Watch, Brutality Unchecked:  Human Rights Abuses Along the U.S. 
Border With Mexico, pp. 5 & 9. 
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civil-military dimension to enforcement. Violence in this context is not only a by-product 
of crime but also a by-product of military confrontation. 
3. Corruption/fraud 
Corruption is a problem that cuts across boundaries, distinguishable only by the 
severity or magnitude of it. In the absence of statistics, one can perhaps argue that 
corruption is more pervasive in Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico, where government 
salaries are relatively low, and monetary incentives high. In all cases, it is linked with 
both the smuggling of drugs and illegal aliens across the border, possibly in conjunction 
with crime organizations. 
Deterrence is complicated by the lack of, or inadequate agency oversight and 
accountability. In addition, corruption undermines enforcement by circumventing the 
legal process. In the United States, computer fraud, the illegal manipulation of INS 
databases in order to legalize the status of an ineligible or illegal alien, is an increasing 
source of concern, especially since it is difficult to detect and trace. 
4. Summary 
In summary, several parallels can be drawn between both case studies and the 
dynamics involved. On the issue of immigration, economic dissatisfaction and frustration 
appear to be the underlying causes for the recent rise in anti-immigrant feelings 
manifested throughout both the United States and Venezuela. As a result, illegal 
immigrants are increasingly being perceived as a social and economic burden. The 
negative public image of illegal immigrants is further compounded by their perceived 
association with illicit activities such as drug trafficking and violent crime. Public 
reaction on the issue of immigration in both countries appears to be comparable and can 
be traced to the same root origins. 
The process of economic integration should lead to the creation of multiple 
channels of interchange and communication, thus enhancing any existing interdependency. 
It is inevitable that both societies, at least along the border, will be drawn closer together. 
However, the issue of illegal immigration, specifically the rights of illegal immigrants to 
health care and other benefits, has engendered controversy and continues to remain a 
75 
highly divisive issue with domestic and foreign policy implications. Despite the overlap 
between domestic and foreign policy, both the United States and Venezuela have opted 
to continue pursuing a domestic approach on immigration policy as applied to illegal 
immigration and migrant labor; and which could ultimately have an adverse effect on 
interstate relations. Harmonization may be further hindered by the lack of consensus 
among overlapping and competing interests due to the complexity of the interdependent 
relationship as well as by the emotional aspect of the problem. 
The extent to which the issue of illegal immigration affects interstate relations is 
dictated by the degree and nature of the existing interdependency. In the case of the 
United States and Mexico, an asymmetrical interdependency may facilitate the use of 
linkage strategies, providing Mexico with a certain amount of political leverage. In 
contrast, linkage strategies may not prove as useful in the case of Venezuela and 
Colombia, where: (1) the interdependency is less well established and potentially less 
asymmetrical; (2) both countries are evenly matched in terms of military power; and (3) 
border related issues have added national security and military implications in comparison 
to the United States and Mexico. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
A comparative analysis of the United States and Mexico, and Venezuela and 
Colombia was conducted in order to examine the relationship between economic 
integration and immigration, with an emphasis on illegal immigration, and their combined 
impact on interstate relations. Various studies conducted on this issue have shown that 
the short-to-medium term impact of economic integration on immigration will likely 
increase migratory pressures. In the long run, however, migratory pressures are expected 
to subside in response to economic development and growth as job markets expand and 
wages increase (Dolores Acevedo and Thomas J. Espenshade, 1992; Wayne A. Cornelius 
and Philip L. Martin, 1993; and Joyce C. Vialet, 1993). 
Although economic integration has been portrayed as a solution for illegal 
immigration by advocates of FTAs, it is not addressed within the context of the 
agreements. Instead, immigration policy has continued to develop independently of 
economic integration, as both the United States and Venezuela continue to pursue a 
unilateral approach in relation to Mexico and Colombia, respectively. This approach is 
inconsistent with the foreign policy implications that immigration-related issues have 
acquired as a result of continued economic and social integration, and could potentially 
have a destabilizing effect on interstate relations. The unilateral pursuit of increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies could indirectly undermine integration efforts by 
exacerbating existing relations. 
Concern over the capacity to absorb immigrants economically and culturally has 
contributed to an environment of intolerance characterized by increased ethnic and racial 
tensions, and a demand for more restrictive immigration policies. In the United States, 
the increased politicization of this issue has polarized the federal and state governments. 
Diverging policies at the state and national level are only one aspect of this controversy., 
The other aspect centers on the issue of unfunded federal mandates. The overlap between 
state and national policy on an issue with foreign and domestic implications, as in the case 
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of illegal immigration, detracts from the federal government's ability to negotiate 
effectively, unless it is able to assert its authority domestically by imposing its own 
agenda.  Failure to do so would result in domestic policy driving foreign policy. 
California's Proposition 187 clearly illustrates this. Passed by the voters of the 
state of California in November 1994, Proposition 187 would deny most social services 
and educational benefits, with the exception of emergency health care, to illegal 
immigrants. Although the constitutionality of Proposition 187 is questionable and its 
implementation (if at all) may take years, several states with large illegal immigrant 
populations are currently contemplating similar measures. The federal government, in 
contrast, has consistently advocated the expansion of enforcement and border control 
assets. 
Official Mexican reaction has been guarded. The Mexican government was a 
major proponent of NAFTA and reiterated its belief that the trade accord would 
eventually reduce immigration. However, former President Salinas also stated in reaction 
to Proposition 187, the need for Mexico and the United States to discuss a freer flow of 
migrant workers just as they have negotiated free trade.129 Proposition 187 may have 
provided the Mexican government with the opportunity to reemphasize the need for future 
bilateral negotiations on the movement of labor and immigrants across the border, 
particularly within the context of economic integration. The ultimate success of U.S. 
efforts to control illegal immigration may be contingent on Mexican cooperation. The 
degree of cooperation may in turn depend on how the United States chooses to approach 
the issue of illegal immigration. 
Venezuela, in contrast, has been able to pursue a national policy without the same 
degree of internal dissent and lack of consensus which has characterized the American 
debate on illegal immigration. Its capacity to act in a more coordinated manner is 
enhanced by a strong central government.  This is in stark contrast to the United States, 
129Tim Golden, "Salinas Urges Talks on Free Migrant Flow," The New York 
Times. November 14, 1994, p. A10. 
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where individual states and local governments enjoy a considerable amount of political 
and fiscal autonomy. As a result, in the United States, state policies may tend to reflect 
local interest more than national interests, whereas in Venezuela, national interests will 
usually prevail over state and local interests. 
The nullification in Venezuela of Decree 1911, eliminating citizenship rights to 
children born of illegal immigrants, although not without controversy, did not elicit the 
same degree of national discord as Proposition 187. Unlike Proposition 187, Decree 1911 
and its subsequent nullification were not state initiatives, but rather reflected prevailing 
national interests. Colombian reaction, as in Mexico, was tempered by economic 
considerations based on a strong commitment to the integration process. In fact, when 
compared to Mexico, Colombian reaction was much more subdued. This may partly be 
ascribed to the short time period (one year) that Decree 1911 was in effect, insufficient 
time for the immigrant population to capitalize upon and establish a widespread pattern 
of behavior based on the benefits offered. 
According to the hypothesis that was initially proposed in the introduction, 
increased racial and ethnic tensions will eventually result in a demand for increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies, which in turn could have an adverse and destabilizing 
effect on the integration process. As discussed previously, concern over the economy and 
ability to absorb different cultures has promoted an environment of intolerance toward 
illegal immigration. This in turn has prompted an increased demand for restrictive 
immigration policies and tighter enforcement. 
However, in an interdependent relationship, domestic and foreign policy issues can 
overlap. Domestic considerations have traditionally prevailed in the formulation of 
immigration policy. With continued integration, however, immigration has begun to 
acquire foreign policy implications. Failure to adjust policy to account for this added 
dimension can adversely affect interstate relations. 
Even though Keohane and Nye suggest that in a complex interdependency the use 
of military force will be rendered increasingly ineffective, the potential for conflict and 
misunderstanding remains high as a function of the rise in complexity and multiplicity of 
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channels linking states. The use of military force has never been a serious option for 
Mexico in the latter half of the twentieth century, given the differences in military force 
structures with the United States. However in the case of Venezuela and Colombia with 
comparable military establishments and a history of border skirmishes, the implications 
of a growing interdependency can be significant, by discouraging the use of a military 
option in lieu of diplomatic approach. 
It is clear that in the United States and Venezuela the current climate of 
intolerance has contributed to a demand for increasingly restrictive immigration policies, 
but the impact on integration is still unclear, especially in the case of the United States 
which has yet to achieve national consensus on how to handle this issue. Although one 
can speculate that the effect on integration would probably be negative, the long term 
impact cannot be fully ascertained at this time. Both NAFTA and the G-3 accord have 
only been in effect for a year or less, too brief a time span to evaluate properly. 
Additionally, the current trend of intolerance may be reversed with improved economic 
conditions, thus reducing the pressures for restrictive policies and restoring an 
environment more conducive to integration. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The continued emphasis on a unilateral approach to immigration within an 
interdependent relationship can only exacerbate interstate relations further, thus potentially 
undermining the process of economic integration and escalating the potential for future 
disagreements. Immigration policies, specifically those dealing with migrant labor, should 
not be formulated exclusively as domestic policy but must increasingly take into account 
foreign policy implications. Although considered politically unfeasible at the time 
NAFTA was negotiated, an agreement on the flow of migratory workers should have been 
developed as a complement to the trade pacts. 
Mexico has repeatedly indicated its willingness to discuss a bilateral agreement to 
regulate the northward flow of illegal immigrants. There is no guarantee that future 
administrations will be as interested as the Salinas government was to pursue a bilateral 
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approach. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to take advantage of the 
current political climate in Mexico to negotiate such an agreement. Venezuela and 
Colombia have already established a series of joint commissions to study border-related 
problems including immigration. The pursuit of a bilateral approach in no way 
compromises U.S. sovereignty and could potentially work in favor of the United States, 
in terms of how it is perceived throughout Latin America. Although this is not a new 
recommendation, the environment of cooperation fostered by an integrationist framework, 




APPENDIX A.  IMMIGRATION POLICIES VENEZUELA (1985) 
Tourist Visa: Valid for 60 days for the express purpose of recreational travel. Requires 
return ticket. Commonly used by illegal immigrants to gain initial entry into the country 
where once employed, the individual was able to exchange it for a "visa de transeunte 
laboral". 
Business Visa:  Valid for 60 days.  Visa must be renewed in country of origin. 
Student Visa:  Valid for 1 year.  Requires school registration. 
Transient Visa-Family: Valid for one year. Granted to family members of legal 
residents. 
Transient Visa-Worker (short term): Valid for 6 months. Essentially a working permit. 
Transient Visa-Worker:  Valid for 1 year.  Requires a notarized contract. 
Resident's Visa:  Valid indefinitely.  Requires a minimum of two years residency. 
Transit Visa: Valid for 72 hours. Requires confirmed reservations with continuation to 
a final destination. 
Source:  Susan Berglund y Humberto Hernandez Caliman. Los de Afuera:  Un Estudio Analitico del Proceso 
Migratorio en Venezuela:  1936-1985. Centre de Estudios de Pastoral y Asistencia Migratoria, Caracas, 1985. 
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APPENDIX B.  BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
- Estatuto de regimen fronterizo (Border Statute of 1942), August 1942: Effort at 
regulating the status of border residents. 
- Tratado sobre demarcacion de fronteras y navegacion de los rios comunes (Treaty 
on the Demarcation of the Border and the Navegation of Rivers), April 1951. 
- Creacion de la tarjeta de transito fronterizo (Creation of a Border Pass), July 1952: 
Specifically addresses border traffic. 
- Tratado de Tonchala (Treaty of Tonchala), November 1959: Both countries agree to 
conduct a census in order to determine the status and number of immigrants. It is the 
first time the issue of illegal immigration is addressed. 
- Acuerdo Comercial y de Desarrollo Economico (Accord on Commercial and Economic 
Development), June 1963: Both governments agree to prosecute employers engaged 
in the abuse of exploitation of migrant labor. 
- Acta de Caracas (Caracas Act), September 1966: Acknowledges the problems and 
implications of illegal immigration. 
- Declaracion conjunta de los Presidented de Venezuela y Colombia.   Declaracion de 
Sochagota  (Joint  Declaration  by  the  Presidents  of Venezuela  and   Colombia, 
Declaration of Sochagota), August 1969:   Statement recognizing the importance in 
socio-economic development in reducing immigration. 
- Comunicado conjunto de los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia and 
Venezuela (Joint Communique by the Ministers of Foreign Relations, Colombia and 
Venezuela), December 1971: Statement calling for additional studies on immigration. 
- Comunicado conjunto de los Cancilleres de Colombia y Venezuela (Joint Communique 
by the Chancellors of Colombia and Venezuela), December 1978: Statement calling 
for the formation of a joint commission to be tasked with studying and analyzing all 
aspects related to immigration in order to develop a more comprehensive regulatory 
approach. 
Source: Ramiro Cardona Gutierrez y Carmen Ines Cruz, eds., Migration de Colombianos a Venezuela, 
Corporacion Centra Regional de Poblacion CCRP y del Fondo Colombiano de Investigaciones y Proyectos 
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